Cessna 550 accident near Fargo, North Dakota, November 30, 2018
On November 30, 2018 at about 7:53 pm local time, a 1980 Cessna 550, registered N941JM, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (IFR final approach) near Fargo, North Dakota (Hector International airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 9 people had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's failure to lower the flaps during the approach and maintain sufficient airspeed while flying in instrument meteorological and icing conditions and the accumulation of ice on the wings’ leading edges, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack and subsequent aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of proper qualification to operate the airplane under a single-pilot exemption due to his lack of total turbine time, which led to task saturation and his failure to properly configure the flaps for landing.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 30, 2018 · about 7:53 pm local time
- Place
- Fargo, North Dakota · Hector International · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 9 people had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 550 No Series, built 1980 · all 550s on the register
- Registration
- N941JM · no longer on the register · serial 550-0146
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot was conducting a cross-country, business flight with 10 passengers onboard the 8-passenger airplane. He reported that air traffic control cleared the flight for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to the runway. While descending, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at 3,100 ft mean sea level (msl), and ice started to accumulate on the wing's leading edges, empennage, and windshield. The pilot activated the pneumatic deice boots multiple times during the approach and slowed the airplane to 120 knots. The airplane then exited the clouds about 400 ft above ground level (agl), and the pilot maintained 120 knots as the airplane flew over the airport fence; all indications for landing were normal. About 100 ft agl, the airplane started to pull right. He applied left correction inputs, but the airplane continued to pull right. He applied engine power to conduct a go-around, but the airplane landed in grass right of the runway, sustaining damage to the wings and landing gear. Witnesses and passengers reported that the airplane stalled. During examination of the airplane immediately after the accident, about 1/2 to 1 inch of mixed ice was found on the right wing's leading edge, the vertical and horizontal stabilizers, and the angle of attack probe. Ice was also observed on the windshield. The flaps were found in the "up" position. Flight control continuity was established. Although the airplane was originally certificated for two-pilot operation, the pilot was flying the airplane under a single-pilot exemption. The pilot received a logbook endorsement indicating that he had received single-pilot training and was properly qualified under the single-pilot exemption. However, he had not met the turbine flight time qualifications (1,000 hours) to be properly authorized to conduct the flight under the single-pilot exemption because he only had 500 hours. A review of cockpit voice recorder information indicated that, although the pilot verbalized that the landing gear was "all green," followed by stating "check, check, check," he did not verbalize all the approach or landing checklist items nor did he make any audible comments about activating the pneumatic deice boots or windshield anti-ice. A review of radar data for the flight indicated that, during the last 2 minutes of flight, while the airplane was on final approach to the runway, the indicated airspeed got as low as 99 knots. The last recorded radar return indicated that the airplane had an airspeed of 104 knots at 900 ft msl. The pilot's lack of minimum flight experience required to fly the airplane without a copilot likely led to task saturation as he flew the airplane entered IMC and icing conditions while on an ILS approach. He subsequently failed to lower the flaps during the approach, which resulted in a no-flap approach instead of a full-flap landing. The ice on the leading edges of the wings, the no-flap approach, and the low airspeed likely led to the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Other weather encounter during approach (IFR final approach)
- Aerodynamic stall/spin during approach (IFR final approach) defining event
- Loss of control in flight during approach (IFR final approach)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Configuration › Incorrect use/operation
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Capability exceeded
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to structural icing › Effect on operation
- factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Qualification/certification › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Workload management › Task overload › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,513 hours in all; 263 in this make and model; 57 in the last 90 days; 10 in the last 30 days; 649 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 2, 2018
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 7,180 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 23, 2017
- Maximum gross weight: 13,500 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whittney JT 15B-4 (turbojet); 12,150 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney JT15B-4 (turbojet); 10,080 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: ISN Williston ND at 6:50 pm
- Destination: FAR Fargo ND
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 18, 9,001 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 200° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 5 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 400 ft
- Temperature: 30°F (-1°C), dew point 30°F (-1°C)
- Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
- Observation at 7:53 pm from FAR
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 9 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
29 documents, released by the NTSB on November 4, 2019. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
