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Accidents · NTSB CEN16FA286 · Final report

Embraer EMB-505 accident near Sugar Land, Texas, July 26, 2016

On July 26, 2016 at about 8:10 pm local time, a 2014 Embraer EMB-505, registered N362FX, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Sugar Land, Texas (Sugar Land Regional airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 2 people had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The airplane’s hydroplaning during the landing roll, which resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s continuation of an unstabilized approach, his decision to land in heavy rain conditions, and his improper use of the main and emergency brake systems. Also contributing was the air traffic controller’s failure to disseminate current airport weather conditions to the flight crew in a timely manner.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 26, 2016 · about 8:10 pm local time
Place
Sugar Land, Texas · Sugar Land Regional · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Embraer EMB-505, built 2014 · all EMB-505s on the register
Registration
N362FX · registry record · serial 50500239
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot executed an instrument approach and landing in heavy rain. The airplane touched down about 21 knots above the applicable landing reference speed, which was consistent with an unstabilized approach. The airplane touched down near the displaced runway threshold about 128 kts, and both wing ground spoilers automatically deployed. The pilot reported that the airplane touched down “solidly,” and he started braking promptly, but the airplane did not slow down. The main wheels initially spun up; however, both wheel speeds subsequently decayed consistent with hydroplaning in the heavy rain conditions. When the wheel speeds did not recover, the brake control unit advised the flight crew of an anti-skid failure; the pilot recalled an anti-skid CAS message displayed at some point during the landing. The pilot subsequently activated the emergency brake system and the wheel speeds decayed. The airplane ultimately overran the departure end of the runway about 60 kts, crossed an airport perimeter road, and encountered a small creek before coming to rest. The wings had separated from, and were located immediately adjacent to, the fuselage. The pilot reported light to moderate rain began on final approach. Weather data and surveillance images indicated that heavy rain and limited visibility prevailed at the airport during the landing. Thunderstorms were active in the vicinity and the rainfall rate at the time of the accident landing was between 4.2 and 6.0 inches per hour. About 4 minutes before the accident, a surface observation recorded the visibility as 3 miles. However, 3 minutes later, the observed visibility had decreased to 3/8 mile. A review of the available information indicated that the tower controller advised the pilot of changing wind conditions and of better weather west of the airport but did not update the pilot regarding visibility along the final approach course or precipitation at the airport. The pilot stated that the rain started 2 to 3 minutes before he landed and commented that it was not the heaviest rain that he had ever landed in. The pilot was using the multifunction display and a tablet for weather radar, which showed green and yellow returns indicating light to moderate rain during the approach. He chose not to turn on the airplane’s onboard weather radar because the other two sources were not indicating severe weather. The runway exhibited skid marks beginning about 1,500 ft from the departure end and each main tire had one patch of reverted rubber wear consistent with reverted rubber hydroplaning. The main landing gear remained extended and both tires remained pressurized. The tire pressures corresponded to a minimum dynamic hydroplaning speed of about 115 kts. The airplane flight manual noted that, in the case of an antiskid failure, the main brakes are to be applied progressively and brake pressure is to be modulated as required. The emergency brake is to be used in the event of a brake failure; however, the pilot activated the emergency brake when the main brakes still functioned; although, without anti-skid protection.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control on ground during landing (landing roll) defining event
  2. Runway excursion during landing (landing roll)
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • factor Environmental issues › Physical environment › Runway/land/takeoff/taxi surface › Wet surface › Effect on operation
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Surface speed/braking › Attain/maintain not possible
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › ATC personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 9,246 hours in all; 1,358 in this make and model; 143 in the last 90 days; 38 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: April 22, 2016
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 11,362 hours in all; 962 in this make and model; 152 in the last 90 days; 75 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: December 11, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,880 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, July 3, 2016; 59 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 17,968 lb
  • Seats: 9
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW535E (turbofan); 1,880 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW535E (turbofan); 1,880 hours total
  • Operator: Flight Options LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: SDL Scottsdale AZ at 5:29 pm
  • Destination: SGR Sugar Land TX
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 35, 8,000 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 130° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 3 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 1,300 ft; a few clouds at 700 ft
  • Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.94 inHg
  • Observation at 8:06 pm from SGR, 1 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig2
Passengers1

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN16FA286.