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Accidents · NTSB CEN11IA087 · Final report

Cessna 560XL incident near Toledo, Ohio, December 1, 2010

On December 1, 2010 at about 6:36 pm local time, a Cessna 560XL, registered N607QS, was involved in an incident during landing near Toledo, Ohio (Toledo Express Airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The manufacturer's inadequate initial design and subsequent modifications of the tailcone, which allowed moisture to collect and freeze around rudder cables during flight levels above the freezing level and resulted in a loss of rudder authority. Contributing to the accident was the lack of oversight of the manufacturer's design and production by the Federal Aviation Administration.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 1, 2010 · about 6:36 pm local time
Place
Toledo, Ohio · Toledo Express Airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 560XL · all 560XLs on the register
Registration
N607QS · registry record · serial 560-5340
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The Cessna 560XL airplane encountered ground and/or in-flight moisture/rain, that collected in the tailcone stinger and subsequently froze around the rudder cables during flight at an altitude above the freezing level. When the pilot attempted to use the rudder to initiate a crosswind correction during the landing flare, he was unable to move the rudder pedals, but was able to land the airplane uneventfully. In the days and weeks that followed, several other 560XL airplanes encountered the same problem. As a result, the airplane manufacturer issued a service bulletin recommending that drain holes be added in the tailcone stinger. The manufacturer had already added the drain holes in production airplanes, yet some production airplanes had drain holes that were not the indicated size. The manufacturer then issued an alert service letter to modify the stinger drain. However, the alert service letter still did not remedy the problem; another 560XL airplane, modified in accordance with the alert service letter, sustained ice-bound rudder cables. The manufacturer subsequently issued a mandatory service bulletin that required the installation of a seal and drain to improve water drainage from the stinger. The misdrilled holes on production airplanes were not detected by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) district office assigned to oversee the incident airplane. The manufacturer has subsequently instituted a specific inspection criteria to verify the drain hole installation on production airplanes, and the FAA has verified engineering requirements, planning changes for technicians to follow, and actual holes, including their dimensions.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Flight control sys malf/fail during landing defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure › Rudder misc structure › Design
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Rain › Contributed to outcome
  • factor Organizational issues › Development › Selection/certification/testing › Equip certification/testing › FAA/Regulator

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 9,889 hours in all; 4,152 in this make and model; 102 in the last 90 days; 31 in the last 30 days; 7,662 as pilot in command; 511 on instruments
  • Last flight review: September 26, 2010
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 8,998 hours in all; 712 in this make and model; 71 in the last 90 days; 27 in the last 30 days; 7,200 as pilot in command; 410 on instruments
  • Last flight review: July 12, 2010
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,738 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, May 17, 2010; 435 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 20,200 lb
  • Seats: 9
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: P&W Canada PW545A (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: P&W Canada PW545A (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Netjets Aviation INC

The flight

  • Departed from: BLM Belmar NJ at 5:07 pm
  • Destination: TOL Toledo OH
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 25, 10,599 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 240° at 18 knots, gusting 25
  • Visibility: 6 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 1,800 ft
  • Temperature: 28°F (-2°C), dew point 21°F (-6°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.84 inHg
  • Observation at 5:52 pm from TOL

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.