Dehavilland DHC-3 accident near Yakutat, Alaska, May 24, 2022
On May 24, 2022 at about 11:10 pm local time, a 1966 Dehavilland DHC-3, registered N703TH, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Yakutat, Alaska (Dry Bay Airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 4 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s failure to determine the actual weight and balance of the airplane before departure, which resulted in the airplane being operated outside of the aft center of gravity limits and the subsequent aerodynamic stall on final approach. Contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require weight and balance documentation for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 single-engine operations.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 24, 2022 · about 11:10 pm local time
- Place
- Yakutat, Alaska · Dry Bay Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Dehavilland DHC-3, built 1966 · all DHC-3s on the register
- Registration
- N703TH · registry record · serial 456
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The purpose of the flight was to transport three passengers and cargo. The pilot reported that, during takeoff, the airplane’s tail came up slightly lowered to the runway when he attempted to raise the tail by applying forward elevator. He stated that he thought this was unusual and attributed it to an aft-loaded airplane. He applied additional nose-down trim and departed without incident. While en route, the tail of the airplane seemed to move up and down, which the pilot attributed to turbulence. Upon arrival at his destination, the pilot entered a left downwind, reduced the power and extended the flaps to 10° abeam the end of the runway. He turned onto the base leg about ½ mile from the approach end of the runway and slowed the airplane to 80 mph. Turning final, he noticed the airplane seemed to pitch up, so he applied full nose-down pitch trim and extended the flaps an additional 10°. On short final he applied full flaps, and the airplane abruptly pitched up to about a 45° angle. He stated that he applied full nose-down elevator, verified the pitch trim, and reduced the power to idle. When the airplane was about 300 ft above ground level, the airplane stalled, the left wing dropped slightly, and the airplane entered about a 45° nose-down dive. After allowing the airplane to gain airspeed, the pilot applied full back elevator. The airplane impacted forested terrain near the approach end of runway 23 at an elevation of about 18 ft. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Elevator and rudder control continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the respective control surfaces. The airplane's estimated gross weight at the time of the accident was about 7,796 lbs and the airplane's estimated center of gravity was about 3.2 to 5.6 inches beyond the approved aft limit. Maximum gross weight for the airplane is 8,000 lbs. The operator did not comply with their operations specifications and the federal regulations that required them to follow the weight and balance control procedures outlined in the aircraft weight and balance section of the pilot operating handbook and the requirement to maintain an aisle between the crew and passenger compartments. The low speed, left roll, and pitch down of the airplane is consistent with an aerodynamic stall. The additional nose down trim at takeoff, the instability of the airplane during cruise flight, the full nose down trim during the approach and rapid pitch up after the application of full flaps are all consistent with an aft center of gravity (CG) condition of sufficient magnitude that the elevator pitch down authority was insufficient to overcome the pitching moment generated by the loading and aircraft configuration. The full down (or landing) flaps exacerbated the nose-up pitching moment due to the increased downwash on the tail and aft shift of the center of pressure. For each flight in multiengine operations, Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 135.63(c) requires the preparation of a load manifest that includes, among other items the number of passengers, total weight of the loaded aircraft, the maximum allowable takeoff weight, and the center of gravity location of the loaded aircraft; one copy of the load manifest should be carried in the airplane, and the operator is required to keep the records for at least 30 days. Single-engine operations, such as the accident flight, are excluded from this requirement. Had the pilot been required to prepare a load manifest that included the number of passengers, total weight of the loaded aircraft, the maximum allowable takeoff weight, and the center of gravity location of the loaded aircraft, he may have been more aware of the airplane’s out-of-center-of-gravity condition. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) previously addressed the exclusion of single-engine operations from the Part 135 weight and balance requirements with the issuance of Safety Recommendations A-89-135, A-99-61, and A-15-29, which asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to amend the record-keeping requirements of 14 CFR 135.63(c) to apply to single-engine as well as multiengine aircraft. The FAA did not take the recommended action, and the NTSB classified Safety Recommendations A-89-135, A-99-61, and A-15-29 "Closed—Unacceptable Action" in 1990, 2014, and 2021, respectively.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Pitch control › Attain/maintain not possible
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › (general) › (general) › Incorrect use/operation
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weight/balance calculations › Not specified
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Pitch control › Capability exceeded
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › CG/weight distribution › Incorrect use/operation
- Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of reg compliance › FAA/Regulator
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 24,000 hours in all; 6,100 in this make and model; 100 in the last 90 days; 60 in the last 30 days; 23,700 as pilot in command; 800 on instruments
- Last flight review: June 21, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Maximum gross weight: 8,000 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Walter M601E-11 (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Operator: Yakutat Coastal Airlines
The flight
- Runway 5/23, 3,600 ft by 170 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 060° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 1,300 ft; clear
- Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
- Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
- Observation at 3:04 pm from PAYA, 42 miles away
Weather report (METAR): PAYA 242304Z AUTO 06003KT 10SM OVC013 08/06 A3002 RMK AO2 T00830056 TSNO
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
13 documents, released by the NTSB on October 5, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Materials Laboratory Factual Report 23-024 | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 2 | GPS - Specialista��s Factual Report | PDF, 12 pages | View Download |
| 3 | GPS Specialist's Factual Report - ATTACHMENT1 | data file | Download |
| 4 | Engine Monitoring Device - Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Engine Monitoring Device - Attachment 1 | data file | Download |
| 6 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Witness Statements | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Wreckage Examination Summary | PDF, 12 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Flight Manual Supplement - Weight & Balance Information | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 10 | Weight and Balance Computations | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 11 | Weight and Balance Documents Provided by Operator | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 12 | Operations Specification Paragraph A096 | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 13 | Photos | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ANC22LA035.
