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Accidents · NTSB ANC14FA068 · Final report

Ryan NAVION A accident near Coldfoot, Alaska, August 24, 2014

On August 24, 2014 at about 9:05 pm local time, a 1949 Ryan NAVION A, registered N4827K, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Coldfoot, Alaska. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 4 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s improper inflight planning and improper decision to deliberately operate the airplane at low altitude in close proximity to obstructions and rising terrain. Contributing to the accident were the pilot’s improper preflight planning and the Federal Aviation Administration’s inappropriate decision to issue a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 certificate to the operator despite the pilot’s history of accidents, incidents, reexaminations, and checkride failures.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 24, 2014 · about 9:05 pm local time · cases in 2014
Place
Coldfoot, Alaska · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
4 people were seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Ryan NAVION A, built 1949 · all NAVION As on the register
Registration
N4827K · registry record · serial NAV-4-1827
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot was conducting a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 commercial air tour flight with three passengers onboard when the airplane impacted rising terrain below the entrance of a high mountain pass. The airplane was substantially damaged, and the pilot and his three passengers were seriously injured. Thirty-five days later, one of the passengers died as a result of his injuries. The pilot initially reported to first responders that he had encountered a severe downdraft while approaching the high mountain pass, which caused the airplane to lose altitude. Review of reported weather conditions at the time of the accident in the area of the pass indicated that the wind speed was 4 to 7 knots, and no indications of sudden downdrafts were discovered. When interviewed by investigators about 2 weeks after the accident, the pilot stated that the right front seat passenger was not wearing his shoulder harness and had slumped onto the flight controls and become unresponsive after taking a motion sickness drug. The pilot further stated that the two rear seat passengers (who had also taken the drug) were also unresponsive when this occurred. However, none of the three passengers recalled this, and the front seat passenger was found with his seatbelt and shoulder harness on when first responders arrived on scene. In a written statement dated about 2 months after his interview, the pilot stated that a propeller blade had separated in flight, as one propeller blade was missing and not recovered from the accident site. The passengers did not recall that this had occurred, and postaccident examination of the propeller hub, propeller blade pilot tubes, propeller blade clamps, and the remaining propeller blade indicated that the missing propeller blade had separated during the impact sequence. Evidence that the missing propeller blade separated on impact included the existence of power signatures on the remaining propeller blade and the presence of a large amount of grease in the hub, which was not thrown out in a centrifugal pattern from the missing propeller blade side of the hub as it would have been if the blade had separated in flight. Further findings indicating that the missing propeller blade separated on impact were a broken clamp bolt head found lying inside the clamp bolt cup of the clamp from the missing propeller blade, impact damage on that same clamp, and a shiny-crescent shaped contact mark on the hub butt in the aft quadrant where the trailing edge of the missing propeller blade would have been located; the crescent-shaped contact mark, which was indicative of aluminum transfer from the missing blade to the hub butt, is typically seen when propeller blades separate during impact. Additionally, metallurgical testing showed that the impact-damaged clamp from the missing propeller blade as well as both of the propeller blade tubes had failed due to overload, and no evidence of fatigue cracking was found. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Several discrepancies were noted with the engine, including the presence of metallic particulates within the oil filter, contamination of the fuel inlet screen with a rubber-like material, and damage to the oil pump consistent with hard particle passage; however, none of these discrepancies would have prevented the engine from producing power. Witness statements, passenger statements, photographs taken during the flight by one of the passengers, and GPS data recovered from a GPS receiver onboard the airplane indicated that, after takeoff, the pilot did not climb to a safe cruising altitude to cross through the mountain pass but instead remained at low altitude. After circling a town, he proceeded up a valley that led to the high mountain pass, flying below the tops of the surrounding mountains in close proximity to terrain and obstructions about 500 feet above ground level. This low altitude flying resulted in the airplane reaching the area of the pass, being boxed in by the surrounding terrain, and not having enough energy or performance to climb up and cross over the pass as the terrain at that point was rising faster than the airplane could climb. Examination of weight and balance information indicated that the pilot had taken off with the airplane loaded over maximum gross weight and that the airplane was near its maximum gross weight when the accident occurred. The pilot's decision to operate the airplane near its maximum gross weight likely contributed to the accident because it reduced the margin of power available for climb. Review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records revealed that, from 2007 to 2012, the pilot had a history of accidents, incidents, reexaminations, and checkride failures. Despite the pilot's history and concerns voiced by numerous FAA personnel during the certification process, the FAA issued a certificate to the pilot in 2012 to conduct commercial air transportation pursuant to 14 CFR Part 135.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
  2. Aircraft loading event during prior to flight
  3. Low altitude operation/event during enroute
  4. Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during maneuvering defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › (general) › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › (general) › Decision related to condition
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Incorrect use/operation
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › (general) › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Capability exceeded
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Flight planning/navigation › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weight/balance calculations › Pilot
  • factor Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation › FAA/Regulator

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 4,759 hours in all; 657 in this make and model; 102 in the last 90 days; 32 in the last 30 days; 4,600 as pilot in command; 2,500 on instruments
  • Last flight review: September 5, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,027 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, June 14, 2014
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,150 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Continental E225-4 (piston); 4,621 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: PABT Bettles AK
  • Destination: PASC Deadhorse AK
  • Flight plan: VFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 030° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 8,000 ft
  • Temperature: 63°F (17°C), dew point 41°F (5°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.87 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

29 documents, released by the NTSB on February 23, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 9 pages View Download
2 Witness Statements and Interview Summaries PDF, 37 pages View Download
3 Memorandum for Record - Tsbc Interview of Daphne Mccann PDF, 2 pages View Download
4 Charts and Satellite Images of Accident Area PDF, 3 pages View Download
5 Weather Reports and Records PDF, 14 pages View Download
6 Weather Reports and Records - Atigun Pass Snotel Site PDF, 2 pages View Download
7 FAA Afss Event Reconstruction Report PDF, 4 pages View Download
8 Weight and Balance Information PDF, 6 pages View Download
9 Excerpts from Passenger Photographs PDF, 13 pages View Download
10 Global Positioning System (GPS) Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 12 pages View Download
11 Attachment 1 to GPS Device Specialists Factual Report data file Download
12 GPS Performance Analysis Report PDF, 59 pages View Download
13 Civil Report Card on GPS Performance PDF, 6 pages View Download
14 Continental Motors - Engine Field Inspection Report PDF, 36 pages View Download
15 Hartzell Propeller - Aircraft Accident Report No. 140824 PDF, 29 pages View Download
16 Hartzell Propeller Engineering Report No. 3945 PDF, 5 pages View Download
17 Excerpts from N4827K Maintenance Records PDF, 13 pages View Download
18 Crankshaft Overhaul - Tag and Invoices PDF, 4 pages View Download
19 Teledyne Continental - Service Bulletin M89-7R1 PDF, 3 pages View Download
20 Teledyne Continental - Service Bulletin SB97-6A PDF, 2 pages View Download
21 FAA Spas Nptrs Record List PDF, 11 pages View Download
22 Memorandum for Record - Review of FAA Memoranda, Emails, and Email Summary PDF, 3 pages View Download
23 Response Letter from FAA Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention PDF, 2 pages View Download
24 Pilot Post Accident Statements Regarding Propeller and GPS PDF, 22 pages View Download
25 Pilot Post Accident Statement Regarding Part 135 PDF, 1 page View Download
26 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 3 pages View Download
27 Wreckage Release and Evidence Control PDF, 10 pages View Download
28 Photo Array PDF, 19 pages View Download
29 Onboard Image Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 3 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ANC14FA068.json.

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Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.

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