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Accidents · NTSB ANC10LA011 · Final report

Piper PA-18 accident near Willow, Alaska, December 31, 2009

On December 31, 2009 at about 6:00 pm local time, a Piper PA-18, registered N146T, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Willow, Alaska (Willow Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to ensure that the airplane’s fuel selector valve was on before takeoff, resulting in a loss of engine power due to fuel starvation, and his subsequent decision to attempt a low altitude turn towards the departure airport, resulting in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 31, 2009 · about 6:00 pm local time
Place
Willow, Alaska · Willow Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-18 · all PA-18s on the register
Registration
N146T · registry record · serial 18-2260
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot was departing on a Title 14, CFR Part 91, personal flight. He said that shortly after takeoff, all engine power was lost, and he turned the airplane left, 180 degrees, in an attempt to return to the runway. During the turn, the airplane descended nose first into an area of snow-covered terrain, coming to rest inverted about 275-yards from the runway end. A postaccident examination revealed that the airplane's fuel valve selector handle was in the near off position. No mechanical anomalies were discovered during the wreckage examination. The pilot said that he fueled the airplane just before the accident flight, but he could not recall if he closed the fuel valve while fueling. He speculated that he may have inadvertently moved the fuel valve selector handle while boarding the airplane, while wearing a pair of heavy, thick, insulated overalls. In the pilot's written statement to the NTSB, he indicated that there were no preaccident mechanical problems with the airplane, and in the section of the report "Recommendation (How could this accident have been prevented?)" the pilot wrote, in part: "Do checklist" and "Land straight ahead when the engine stops." Given the lack of mechanical deficiencies with the airplane's engine or flight controls, in conjunction with the pilot’s statement, it is likely the pilot failed to ensure that the airplane's fuel valve was properly positioned before takeoff, and then failed to adequately maintain control of the airplane while returning to the airport after the power loss.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel starvation during initial climb defining event
  2. Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb
  3. Loss of control in flight during initial climb
  4. Aerodynamic stall/spin during initial climb
  5. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea
  • Flight time: 1,708 hours in all; 221 in this make and model; 1 in the last 90 days; 1 in the last 30 days; 1,688 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,610 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, November 21, 2009
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-320-B2B (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: UUO Willow AK at 6:00 pm
  • Destination: IYS Wasilla AK
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 31, 4,400 ft by 75 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 7°F (-14°C), dew point 1°F (-17°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.97 inHg
  • Observation at 5:16 pm from PAWS, 18 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Other NTSB records under N146T the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

1986-08-19ANC86LA136 · accident near Mcneil River, AK · substantial damage · no injuries

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ANC10LA011.