Piper PA-24-250 accident near Auburn, Washington, June 12, 2022

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that, while approaching the destination airport, he moved the fuel selector from the left main fuel tank to the right main fuel tank. About 5 miles from the airport, he completed the before-landing checklist and reduced the engine power setting to 15 inches of manifold pressure while he slowly advanced the propeller lever forward. Shortly after, the engine lost total power. The pilot immediately verified that the position of the mixture was full rich, and that the fuel boost pump was on. The pilot moved the fuel selector lever from the right main tank to left main tank, but then decided to switch back to the right main tank, as the right tank contained more fuel. The engine briefly started, but again lost all power. The pilot initiated a forced landing to an open field and the airplane impacted a dirt berm during the landing roll, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. Postaccident examination of the engine and engine systems revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction. Examination of the fuel supply and fuel vent systems revealed no evidence of blockage, and the fuel selector functioned normally when tested. At the accident site, the left main fuel tank contained about one gallon of fuel; the right main, right auxiliary, and left auxiliary tanks all appeared full. Additionally, the pilot reported that he examined the fuel tanks immediately after the accident; the right tank was full, and he could not see any fuel in the left main tank. Although the environmental conditions at the time of the accident were favorable for serious carburetor icing at glide power or reduced power settings, the pilot reported that he reduced engine power for landing just before the loss of power occurred; therefore, the airplane had not been operating at reduced power settings for an extended period of time; therefore, it is unlikely that carburetor icing resulted in the interruption of the fuel flow. Although the pilot’s statement indicated that he switched fuel tanks several minutes before the loss of engine power, given the distribution of the fuel in the tanks following the accident and the lack of any mechanical anomalies found during postaccident examination, it is most likely that the pilot exhausted the available fuel in the left main tank, resulting in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.