Piper PA18 accident near Hood River, Oregon, September 6, 2019
On September 6, 2019 at about 5:09 pm local time, a 1974 Piper PA18, registered N14365, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Hood River, Oregon (Ken Jernstedt Airfield). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The total loss of engine power shortly after takeoff as a result of the private pilot’s failure to ensure the fuel selector was in the appropriate position and the certified flight instructor’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack at the time of the engine power loss, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of airplane control.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 6, 2019 · about 5:09 pm local time
- Place
- Hood River, Oregon · Ken Jernstedt Airfield · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA18 150, built 1974 · all PA18s on the register
- Registration
- N14365 · registry record · serial 18-7409092
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Witnesses observed the airplane takeoff, and one witness noted its nose-high attitude during takeoff. They then heard the engine lose power. The airplane subsequently pitched down and began a rotation to the right before impacting the ground just north of the runway. First responders reported that the fuel selector valve was found in the OFF position when they arrived at the accident site, and they also noted fuel leaking from the airplane. Further examination of the airplane revealed the fuel selector indicator plate displayed a red witness mark adjacent to the fuel selector pointer under one of the OFF-indicator marks, which is an indication the selector was in the OFF position at the time of impact. No evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures were identified that would have precluded normal operation. Because the engine lost power during takeoff, it is possible that there was enough residual fuel in the fuel lines to start the engine and taxi to the runway, even with the selector in the OFF position. The private pilot was seated in the front seat and the certified flight instructor was seated in the rear seat. The fuel selector was located on the left cabin wall closest to the private pilot; it is likely the private pilot failed to check the position before takeoff. When the airplane departed, it was about 21 pounds over the maximum takeoff weight. An increase in the airplane’s weight would have an adverse effect on stability and controllability. Because the airplane was already in a nose-high attitude when the engine lost power, the airplane likely stalled. The increased weight and low altitude when the power loss occurred prevented the pilots from recovering. Postmortem toxicology testing detected quinine in the certified flight instructor’s blood and urine at a level that was not quantified; therefore, the amount detected was likely from a tonic drink containing quinine rather than ingestion of the drug and would not have been impairing.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during takeoff defining event
- Loss of control in flight during takeoff
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during takeoff
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Unintentional use/operation
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Capability exceeded
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Instructor/check pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: glider; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 21,012 hours in all; 0 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rear
- Injury: fatal
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea
- Flight time: 254 hours in all; 0 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,142.5 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, August 1, 2019
- Maximum gross weight: 1,750 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4A (piston); 0 hours total
- Operator: Pa-18 LLC
The flight
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 25, 3,040 ft by 75 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
- Altimeter: 30.04 inHg
- Observation at 9:55 am from K4S2, 1 miles away
Weather report (METAR): METAR K4S2 061655Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 23/15 A3004 RMK AO2=
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 2 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR19FA251.