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Accidents · NTSB WPR18FA201 · Final report

Douglas DC3 accident near Burnet, Texas, July 21, 2018

On July 21, 2018 at about 2:15 pm local time, a 1943 Douglas DC3, registered N47HL, was destroyed in an accident during takeoff near Burnet, Texas (Burnet Muni Kate Craddock Fiel airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 6 people were seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries; 6 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The copilot's failure to maintain directional control during the initial takeoff roll and the pilot's failure to adequately monitor the copilot during the takeoff and his delayed remedial action, which resulted in the airplane briefly becoming airborne and subsequently experiencing an aerodynamic stall.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 21, 2018 · about 2:15 pm local time
Place
Burnet, Texas · Burnet Muni Kate Craddock Fiel · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
6 people were seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries; 6 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Douglas DC3 B, built 1943 · all DC3s on the register
Registration
N47HL · no longer on the register · serial 27203
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

According to the copilot, before takeoff, he and the pilot had briefed that the copilot would conduct the takeoff for the planned cross-country flight and be the pilot flying and that the pilot would be the pilot monitoring. The accident flight was the copilot's first takeoff in the accident airplane with it at or near its maximum gross weight. The pilot reported that he taxied the airplane onto the runway and locked the tailwheel in place and that the copilot then took over the controls. About 13 seconds after the start of the takeoff roll, the airplane veered slightly right, and the copilot counteracted with left rudder input. The airplane then swerved left, and shortly after the pilot took control of the airplane. The airplane briefly became airborne; the pilot stated that he knew the airplane was slow as he tried to ease it back over to the runway and set it back down. Subsequently, he felt the shudder “of a stall,” and the airplane rolled left and impacted the ground, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the left wing struck the ground. After the airplane came to a stop, a postimpact fire ensued. All the airplane occupants egressed through the aft left door. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the flight controls or tailwheel. Both outboard portions of the of the aluminum shear pin within the tailwheel strut assembly were sheared off, consistent with side load forces on the tailwheel during the impact sequence. The copilot obtained his pilot-in-command type rating and his checkout for the accident airplane about 2 months and 2 weeks before the accident, respectively. The copilot had conducted two flights in the accident airplane with a unit instructor before the accident. The instructor reported that, during these flights, he noted that the copilot had directional control issues; made "lazy inputs, similar to those for small airplanes"; tended to go to the right first; and seemed to overcorrect to the left by leaving control inputs in for too long. He added that, after the checkout was completed, the copilot could take off and land without assistance; however, he had some concern about the his reaction time to a divergence of heading on the ground. Given the evidence, it is likely the copilot failed to maintain directional control during the initial takeoff roll. It is also likely that, if the pilot, who had more experience in the airplane, had monitored the copilot's takeoff more closely and taken remedial action sooner, he may have been able to correct the loss of directional control before the airplane became briefly airborne and subsequently experienced an aerodynamic stall.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control on ground during takeoff
  2. Loss of control in flight during takeoff defining event
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during takeoff

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Copilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other person › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Directional control › Not attained/maintained
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Capability exceeded

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: instrument airplane
  • Flight time: 12,500 hours in all; 2,500 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: March 2, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 8,000 hours in all; 17 in this make and model; 30 in the last 90 days; 10 in the last 30 days; 5,000 on instruments
  • Last flight review: May 4, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
  • Maximum gross weight: 33,000 lb
  • Seats: 19
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney 1830 (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney 1830 (piston); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Commemorative Air Force

The flight

  • Departed from: BMQ Burnet TX at 2:17 pm
  • Destination: DMO Sedalia MO
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 19, 5,000 ft by 75 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 200° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 9 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 300 ft
  • Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.07 inHg
  • Observation at 2:31 pm from KBMQ

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig21
Passengers415

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR18FA201.