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Accidents · NTSB WPR14TA357 · Final report

Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B3 accident near Hemet, California, August 28, 2014

On August 28, 2014 at about 5:55 pm local time, a 2000 Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B3, registered N991SD, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near Hemet, California (Hemet-Ryan Airport). It was a public-use flight (local) under public-use (government) rules. 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The flight instructor's failure to adequately brief and demonstrate the simulated emergency procedure to the pilot under instruction and his delayed remedial action and inadequate supervision during the maneuver, which resulted in an excessive sink rate and a hard landing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 28, 2014 · about 5:55 pm local time
Place
Hemet, California · Hemet-Ryan Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B3, built 2000 · all AS 350 B3s on the register
Registration
N991SD · no longer on the register · serial 3325
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Public-use flight (local) · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction toward his commercial certificate worked for the Riverside County Sheriff's Department (RCSD) and were conducting a local instructional flight in the helicopter. However, the helicopter remained on alert status in the event of a need for response. The instructor reported that they started a maneuver to simulate a governor failure at 500 ft above ground level (agl) by switching the auto/manual switch to manual. With the switch in manual, the full authority digital engine control governor was disengaged, which required the pilot to use the twist grip throttle control on the collective to increase and decrease power. They then proceeded on an extended left downwind for 2.5 miles, and the pilot practiced manipulating the twist grip. The pilot then turned onto the base leg, turned from the base to final leg, started descending, and reduced the throttle input (rolled off the throttle). As the helicopter approached the runway threshold about 50 to 100 ft agl, the instructor noticed that the rotor rpm was decreasing a little more than he expected. He rolled the throttle on but noticed that the rotor rpm was not increasing. While the helicopter was about 50 ft agl and over the runway threshold, the flight instructor noticed that it was quickly descending and that the rotor rpm was continuing to decrease. His attempts to increase the rotor rpm by pulling aft cyclic and lowering the collective were unsuccessful. The helicopter then impacted the runway surface hard, rotated left 180 degrees, rolled over, and came to rest on its left side facing northeast. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot was the first RCSD pilot to obtain only a private certificate from an outside vendor and then work on getting a commercial certificate with an RCSD flight instructor. There was no formal training syllabus, and the pilot did not know before the flight what maneuvers were to be performed. After completing in-flight simulated instrument work and with the helicopter still running on the ground, the instructor briefed the private pilot on the simulated governor failure maneuver; however, he did not demonstrate the maneuver in flight before he had the pilot perform it. Further, the instructor did not provide the pilot with an opportunity to adequately practice coordinating movements of the collective and the twist grip throttle before attempting a landing, likely because he had been talking to dispatch since the beginning of the maneuver. It is likely that the instructor's failure to demonstrate the maneuver and to provide the pilot with adequate opportunity to practice manipulating the twist grip throttle before attempting a landing resulted in the pilot mismanaging the twist grip throttle during the final approach, which led to a decay in rotor rpm. Further, it is likely that the instructor's inadequate supervision and delayed remedial action during the final approach resulted in the unsuccessful performance of the maneuver.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Simulated/training event during approach (VFR pattern downwind)
  2. Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event
  3. Roll over during post (impact)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other person › Instructor/check pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Prop/rotor parameters › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Instructor/check pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Instructor/check pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › (general) › Instructor/check pilot
  • Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training › (general) › Operator

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot, private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 2,542 hours in all; 1,973 in this make and model; 95 in the last 90 days; 18 in the last 30 days; 2,440 as pilot in command; 93 on instruments
  • Last flight review: December 2, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Dual student

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 259 hours in all; 77 in this make and model; 121 in the last 90 days; 49 in the last 30 days; 141 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: July 30, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,312 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, July 25, 2014
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,960 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Turbomeca Ariel 2B (turboshaft); 6,026 hours total
  • Operator: County Of Riverside

The flight

  • Departed from: HMT Hemet CA at 5:40 pm
  • Destination: HMT Hemet CA
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 23, 4,314 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 200° at 3 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 90°F (32°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
  • Observation at 5:55 pm from KF70

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Other NTSB records under N991SD the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

1999-10-08LAX00TA006 · accident near Moreno Valley, CA · substantial damage · no injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.