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Accidents · NTSB WPR14FA195 · Final report

American Eurocopter CORP AS350B3 accident near Peach Springs, Arizona, May 18, 2014

On May 18, 2014 at about 11:00 pm local time, a 2013 American Eurocopter CORP AS350B3 (helicopter), registered N840PA, was substantially damaged in an accident during standing (engine(s) operating) near Peach Springs, Arizona (Grand Canyon West airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s decision to exit the helicopter while it was running and his failure to properly secure the flight controls with the engine operating at flight idle before exiting the helicopter.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 18, 2014 · about 11:00 pm local time
Place
Peach Springs, Arizona · Grand Canyon West · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
American Eurocopter CORP AS350B3 B2, built 2013
Registration
N840PA · registry record · serial 7718
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot was repositioning the helicopter and advised ground personnel that he intended to land and perform a "fluid check." Company personnel reported that most pilots used this term when they intended to land away from the awaiting passengers and exit the helicopter to relieve themselves. The pilots would generally leave the engine running when outside the helicopter. The helicopter was equipped with an on board video recording system. The recording revealed that the pilot landed the helicopter in a location that had a direct buffeting crosswind. The pilot tightened the friction on the cyclic, which then did not move. The twist grip light illuminated, and engine audio was consistent with the throttle being moved toward ground idle. About 6 seconds later, the twist grip light extinguished, engine audio was consistent with an increase in power to flight idle; engine data parameters indicate that the twist grip was moved to flight idle. On the video, the collective position continued to increase. About 15 seconds later, the pilot exited the helicopter. External audio indicated a sound similar to N1 increasing. For the next 24 seconds, the video showed an increase in airframe buffeting. The helicopter then began to pitch nose down. One second later, the helicopter began to roll right; the roll increased, and the helicopter then began to yaw left. The sound of the door opening was heard, likely indicating that the pilot attempted to enter the helicopter. The helicopter continued to roll and yaw until noises consistent with the rotor blades impacting the ground were heard. The operator had a policy that required a pilot to always be at the controls of a running helicopter. However, according to pilot interviews, this policy was not generally followed, and the pilots would not shut down the helicopter when they needed to relieve themselves. However, pilots who were interviewed stated that they would leave the helicopter operating at ground idle. It could not be determined why the pilot would leave the helicopter while it was operating at flight idle without the flight controls properly secured.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control on ground during standing (engine(s) operating) defining event
  2. AC/prop/rotor contact w person during standing (engine(s) operating)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 2,125 hours in all; 43 in this make and model; 2,058 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 17, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 103 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, May 17, 2014; 6 hours since
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Turbomeca Arriel 2B1 (turboshaft); 97 hours total
  • Operator: Papillon Airways INC

The flight

  • Departed from: 1G4 Peach Springs AZ at 10:55 pm
  • Destination: 1G4 Peach Springs AZ
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 210° at 19 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 88°F (31°C), dew point 10°F (-12°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.79 inHg
  • Observation at 10:51 pm from KIGM, 45 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.