Piper PA-44-180 accident near Tooele, Utah, April 21, 2010
On April 21, 2010 at about 1:00 am local time, a Piper PA-44-180, registered N331GP, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Tooele, Utah (Tooele Valley airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The complete loss of power in one engine due to fuel starvation as a result of the pilot's failure to reposition the cross-feed valve prior to takeoff and the flight instructor's failure to monitor the pilot's actions. Contributing to the accident was the instructor pilot's failure to monitor the fuel level during the flight and his decision to turn left (into the failed engine) after the loss of power.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- April 21, 2010 · about 1:00 am local time
- Place
- Tooele, Utah · Tooele Valley · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA-44-180 · all PA-44-180s on the register
- Registration
- N331GP · registry record · serial 44-7995277
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Prior to starting the before-takeoff checklist in preparation for the instructional flight in the twin-engine airplane, the private pilot-rated student performed the required engine/fuel tank cross-feed check. At the completion of that check, she inadvertently forgot to reposition the right engine fuel selector to the "ON" position, but instead left it in "Cross-Feed." Therefore, as the flight progressed with both engines using fuel from the left tank, it ultimately led to the consumption of all usable full in that tank. Therefore, the left engine lost all power during the initial climb after takeoff from a practice short-field landing. When the engine lost power, the student realized the right engine fuel selector was in "Cross-feed"and repositioned it to the "ON" position, but did not advise the flight instructor that she had done so. The flight instructor, who took control of the airplane after the loss of power, was unable to get the left propeller to fully feather due to the low oil pressure created by the low engine rpm. He therefore decided to attempted to turn back to the airport, but in doing so turned left (into the failed engine), and the airplane therefore began to descend at a rate that made it unlikely that he could safely reach the runway. He therefore landed in a nearby open field, whereupon the airplane encountered rough terrain and experienced a collapse of the left main landing gear. The commercially produced expanded checklist that the student was using did not have an added step in the "Before-Takeoff" section calling for a recheck of the fuel valves in the "ON" position. The expanded checklist produced by the airplane's operator did have such a step, but the operator did not have a written policy requiring the use of their checklist.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Miscellaneous/other during standing (engine(s) operating)
- Fuel starvation during initial climb
- Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Landing gear collapse during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other person › Instructor/check pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring equip/instruments › Instructor/check pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Instructor/check pilot
- Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,207 hours in all; 127 in this make and model; 174 in the last 90 days; 56 in the last 30 days; 2,108 as pilot in command; 1,718 on instruments
- Last flight review: August 21, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 268 hours in all; 34 in this make and model; 20 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: November 8, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,908 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, March 24, 2010
- Maximum gross weight: 3,800 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Lycoming O-360-E1A6D (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Lycoming LO-360-E1A6D (piston); 0 hours total
- Operator: Leading Edge Aviation
The flight
- Departed from: KSLC Salt Lake City UT
- Destination: KSLC Salt Lake City UT
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 190° at 14 knots, gusting 23
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 20,000 ft; a few clouds at 5,500 ft
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Altimeter: 29.60 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.