Accidents · NTSB OPS09IA001 · Final report

An amateur-built aircraft and an amateur-built aircraft incident near Peoria, Illinois, September 22, 2008

On September 22, 2008 at about 10:50 pm local time, 2 aircraft, an amateur-built aircraft and an amateur-built aircraft, were involved in the same incident near Peoria, Illinois (Greater Peoria Regional Airpor airport). No one was hurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The tower local controller's failure to provide adequate separation between EGF4075 and SKW5961 that landed on intersecting runways.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date: September 22, 2008 · about 10:50 pm local time
Place: Peoria, Illinois · Greater Peoria Regional Airpor · map
Type: Incident
Injuries: No one was hurt.
Weather: visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1: An amateur-built aircraft
Registration: not recorded
Damage: Not recorded
Flight: Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
Aircraft 2: An amateur-built aircraft
Registration: not recorded
Damage: Not recorded
Flight: Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative for the an amateur-built aircraft final · quoted from the NTSB record

On Monday, September 22, 2008 at 1750 central daylight time, Skywest (SKW) flight 5961, a Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ-200), and American Eagle (EGF) flight 4075, an Embraer ERJ-145 (E145) were cleared to land simultaneously on intersecting runways at the Greater Peoria Regional Airport (PIA) in Peoria, Illinois. The air traffic control tower operator that cleared the two aircraft to land was a position certified developmental controller working local control (LC). EGF4075, number 1 in the landing sequence, on a visual approach to runway 22, rejected the landing clearance stating he was too high and requested a 360 degree turn on final. The LC disapproved the request due to aircraft that were following and directed EGF4075 to enter a right downwind for runway 13. At 1747:45, LC cleared SKW5961, on a visual approach, to land on runway 22 when the flight was four miles from the landing threshold. At 1748:09, LC cleared EGF4075 to land on runway 13 and advised that a regional jet was on a three mile final for runway 22. At 1749:45, SKW5961 was on landing rollout and LC asked if they could hold short of runway 13. The crew advised they could. The LC directed SKW5961 to hold short of runway 13 for landing traffic. SKW5961 did not acknowledge the hold short instructions. Five seconds later SKW5961 transmitted "Well almost, uh, but uh, we're here what do you want us to do". The LC directed SKW5961 to hold short of runway 13, because of landing traffic. SKW 5961 responded; "We're kind of technically on the runway [runway 22] but there's plenty of room for a small plane". SKW5961 had stopped short of runway 22 on runway 13 just past old land and hold short (LAHSO) markings on runway 13. The pilot of SKW5961 assumed the LASHO markings on runway 13 was the hold short point for the intersection of runways 13 and 22. LAHSO is an acronym for "Land and Hold Short Operation." These operations include landing and holding short of an intersecting runway, a taxiway, a predetermined point, or an approach/departure flightpath. A LAHSO hold short point is a point on the runway beyond which a landing aircraft with a LAHSO clearance is not authorized to proceed. This point may be located prior to an intersecting runway, taxiway, predetermined point, or approach/departure flight path. The LAHSO markings on runway 13 are 235 feet from the edge of runway 22. PIA is not a LASHO airport even though LASHO markings are maintained by the airport authority. The PIA air traffic manager, at PIA for approximately one year, was not ware of when PIA ceased LAHSO operations. According to the PIA ATCT Order 7110.1B, Peoria Air Traffic Control (ATC) Facility Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), reference to LAHSO were removed in November 2001. After SKW5961 reported they were technically on runway 22, the LC directed the pilot to hold his position. At 1750:42 LC instructed EGF4075 to exit runway 13 at taxiway M, 1900 feet from the intersection of runway 13 and runway 22, followed shortly thereafter with instructions to SKW5961 to turn right onto runway 31 and turn right onto taxiway M. The LC, stated that he believed that SKW5961 would exit runway 22 at taxiway E and that EGF4075 would fly a longer downwind leg of the traffic pattern. This belief resulted in the LC clearing EGF4075 to land on runway 13 prior to having assured separation between aircraft landing on intersecting runways. When the LC realized that separation would be close, he observed SKW5961 stopped on runway 22 short of runway 13 and believed separation was assured. When SKW5961 advised they were technically on runway 13, the LC considered it safer to allow EGF4075 to land rather direct a go around considering the critical phase of flight EGF4075 was in at the time. The controller-in-charge (CIC) was working combined positions that included ground control, flight data, and clearance delivery and stated that he did not perceive a situation developing that would have resulted in a loss of separation. Per FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 3-10-4, Intersecting Runway Separation: "Issue traffic information to each aircraft operating on intersecting runways. a. Separate an arriving aircraft using one runway from another aircraft using an intersecting runway or a nonintersecting runway when the flight paths intersect by ensuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the landing threshold or flight path of the other aircraft until one of the following conditions exists: 1. The preceding aircraft has departed and passed the intersection/flight path or is airborne and turning to avert any conflict. 2. A preceding arriving aircraft is clear of the landing runway, completed landing roll and will hold short of the intersection/flight path, or has passed the intersection/flight path." Tower staffing included four controllers: LC, and another controller working ground control, flight data, clearance delivery, and controller-in-charge (CIC) positions combined. Two controllers were on break. The weather at PIA at 1754 was wind 130 at 04 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 6500 feet, broken clouds at 10,000 feet, temperature 27 degrees Celsius, dew point 16 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.26 inches of mercury. Sunset occurred at 1807. The runways were dry.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the an amateur-built aircraft final · quoted from the NTSB record

On Monday, September 22, 2008 at 1750 central daylight time, Skywest (SKW) flight 5961, a Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ-200), and American Eagle (EGF) flight 4075, an Embraer ERJ-145 (E145) were cleared to land simultaneously on intersecting runways at the Greater Peoria Regional Airport (PIA) in Peoria, Illinois. The air traffic control tower operator that cleared the two aircraft to land was a position certified developmental controller working local control (LC). EGF4075, number 1 in the landing sequence, on a visual approach to runway 22, rejected the landing clearance stating he was too high and requested a 360 degree turn on final. The LC disapproved the request due to aircraft that were following and directed EGF4075 to enter a right downwind for runway 13. At 1747:45, LC cleared SKW5961, on a visual approach, to land on runway 22 when the flight was four miles from the landing threshold. At 1748:09, LC cleared EGF4075 to land on runway 13 and advised that a regional jet was on a three mile final for runway 22. At 1749:45, SKW5961 was on landing rollout and LC asked if they could hold short of runway 13. The crew advised they could. The LC directed SKW5961 to hold short of runway 13 for landing traffic. SKW5961 did not acknowledge the hold short instructions. Five seconds later SKW5961 transmitted "Well almost, uh, but uh, we’re here what do you want us to do". The LC directed SKW5961 to hold short of runway 13, because of landing traffic. SKW 5961 responded; "We’re kind of technically on the runway [runway 22] but there’s plenty of room for a small plane". SKW5961 had stopped short of runway 22 on runway 13 just past old land and hold short (LAHSO) markings on runway 13. The pilot of SKW5961 assumed the LASHO markings on runway 13 was the hold short point for the intersection of runways 13 and 22. LAHSO is an acronym for "Land and Hold Short Operation." These operations include landing and holding short of an intersecting runway, a taxiway, a predetermined point, or an approach/departure flightpath. A LAHSO hold short point is a point on the runway beyond which a landing aircraft with a LAHSO clearance is not authorized to proceed. This point may be located prior to an intersecting runway, taxiway, predetermined point, or approach/departure flight path. The LAHSO markings on runway 13 are 235 feet from the edge of runway 22. PIA is not a LASHO airport even though LASHO markings are maintained by the airport authority. The PIA air traffic manager, at PIA for approximately one year, was not ware of when PIA ceased LAHSO operations. According to the PIA ATCT Order 7110.1B, Peoria Air Traffic Control (ATC) Facility Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), reference to LAHSO were removed in November 2001. After SKW5961 reported they were technically on runway 22, the LC directed the pilot to hold his position. At 1750:42 LC instructed EGF4075 to exit runway 13 at taxiway M, 1900 feet from the intersection of runway 13 and runway 22, followed shortly thereafter with instructions to SKW5961 to turn right onto runway 31 and turn right onto taxiway M. The LC, stated that he believed that SKW5961 would exit runway 22 at taxiway E and that EGF4075 would fly a longer downwind leg of the traffic pattern. This belief resulted in the LC clearing EGF4075 to land on runway 13 prior to having assured separation between aircraft landing on intersecting runways. When the LC realized that separation would be close, he observed SKW5961 stopped on runway 22 short of runway 13 and believed separation was assured. When SKW5961 advised they were technically on runway 13, the LC considered it safer to allow EGF4075 to land rather direct a go around considering the critical phase of flight EGF4075 was in at the time. The controller-in-charge (CIC) was working combined positions that included ground control, flight data, and clearance delivery and stated that he did not perceive a situation developing that would have resulted in a loss of separation. Per FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 3-10-4, Intersecting Runway Separation: "Issue traffic information to each aircraft operating on intersecting runways. a. Separate an arriving aircraft using one runway from another aircraft using an intersecting runway or a runway when the flight paths intersect by ensuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the landing threshold or flight path of the other aircraft until one of the following conditions exists: 1. The preceding aircraft has departed and passed the intersection/flight path or is airborne and turning to avert any conflict. 2. A preceding arriving aircraft is clear of the landing runway, completed landing roll and will hold short of the intersection/flight path, or has passed the intersection/flight path." Tower staffing included four controllers: LC, and another controller working ground control, flight data, clearance delivery, and controller-in-charge (CIC) positions combined. Two controllers were on break. The weather at PIA at 1754 was wind 130 at 04 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 6500 feet, broken clouds at 10,000 feet, temperature 27 degrees Celsius, dew point 16 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.26 inches of mercury. Sunset occurred at 1807. The runways were dry.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the an amateur-built aircraft from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

Near midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation during landing defining event
Runway incursion veh/AC/person during landing

The NTSB's findings

Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › Pilot
Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › ATC personnel
cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › ATC personnel
Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action sequence › ATC personnel
Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › ATC personnel

The aircraft

Landing gear: fixed
Operator: American Airlines

The flight

Runway 13, 10,104 ft by 150 ft
A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

Wind: from 130° at 4 knots
Visibility: 10 statute miles
Sky: broken clouds at 10,000 ft; a few clouds at 6,500 ft
Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
Altimeter: 30.26 inHg
Observation at 10:54 pm from KPIA

The factual record for the an amateur-built aircraft from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

Near midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation during landing defining event

The NTSB's findings

Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action sequence › ATC personnel
Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › ATC personnel
cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › ATC personnel
Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › Pilot
Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › ATC personnel

The aircraft

Landing gear: fixed

The flight

Runway 22, 8,003 ft by 150 ft
A second pilot was aboard

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.