Bombardier, Inc. CL-600-2B16 accident near Teterboro, New Jersey, October 31, 2006

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

While level at 3,000 feet above mean sea level and receiving radar vectors for an instrument approach, the pilots received a traffic advisory (TA) from the airplane's Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The co-pilot was flying the airplane when the TA was issued, and began a visual scan for the traffic. The pilot-in-command then "yanked the controls" out of the copilot's hands, and began a banking left turn. Moments later, the TCAS issued a resolution advisory (RA) commanding a climb, so the pilot increased the airplane's pitch attitude, and climbed approximately 800 feet while simultaneously rolling wings level. Neither pilot made visual contact with the airplane for which the RA was issued. During the maneuver, the flight attendant broke her left leg. The airplane, which triggered the TA passed within 0.75 nautical miles laterally, and 100 feet vertically of the accident airplane. While air traffic control did not consider the airplane to be on a collision course, they did notify the accident crew of the airplane's position. The accident airplane's flight data recorder indicated a maximum angle of attack of 15.6 degrees, a maximum bank of 32 degrees, and an altitude increase to 3,778 feet in 16 seconds. The entire maneuver lasted 40 seconds, rate of climb peaked at 2,628.75 feet per minute, and maximum acceleration reached 2.3 Gs. According to the operator a typical RA response consisted of a maneuver requiring a G-force of +/- .25g and when using the information from the TCAS traffic advisory display the flight crew should commence a visual search for the intruder and if, and only if, the intruder is visually acquired, maneuver the aircraft to maintain separation. They also warned their flight crews that maneuvers based solely on TCAS traffic advisories (TA), without visual acquisition of the intruder were not recommended, and that, "certain vertical speeds were not safe" and that the flight crew should monitor their vertical speed indicator (VSI) and keep the VSI pointer out of the "red prohibited area." The guidance provided also advised to "be prepared to maneuver," should an RA sound 10 to 15 seconds later and that the pilot flying should maneuver the airplane "promptly and smoothly" in response to an RA.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.