Beech 95-B55 accident near Lakeland, Florida, October 9, 2005

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Before takeoff the main fuel tanks were filled; postaccident testing of a specimen of fuel from the truck that fueled the accident airplane revealed the sample met specification for 100 Low Lead fuel. An engine run-up before takeoff was performed by the pilot-rated passenger in the left front seat and the rpm decrease when checking each magneto was approximately 75. The flight was cleared to takeoff from runway 27 with all runway available (8,500 feet), and the pilot reported the airplane became airborne in no more than 2,000 feet. The Pilot's Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual (POH/AFM) indicates that based on the conditions at the time of the accident, the total distance to clear a 50-foot obstacle was 2,250 feet. The pilot reportedly climbed at blue-line airspeed and kept the landing gear retracted until insufficient runway remained to land where he was flying at 50 feet above ground level. The POH/AFM indicates that the airplane was capable of climbing at 800 feet-per-minute with the landing gear and flaps extended, and full power on both engines. The controller reported that the airplane was climbing "very slow", and he did not hear of a loss of engine power nor did he see smoke trailing from the engines during takeoff. The pilot reported that when he retracted the landing gear, the engine sound decreased and he sensed the airplane was not accelerating, but this was not indicated on the engine gauges, nor was it indicated by the airplane yawing,so he did not check for an engine out. He confirmed the throttle, mixture, and propeller controls were full forward, and a short time later he heard the stall warning horn and pitched down to maintain blue-line airspeed. He thought about returning to the departure airport but lost altitude during a turn. He lowered the landing gear, flew under powerlines, and impacted in a field in a wings level attitude. All occupants exited the airplane which was destroyed by the postcrash fire. Examination of the engines following recovery revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Postcrash fire damage to the engine accessories and controls precluded bench or operational testing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

Other NTSB records under N6413S the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time