Eurocopter EC 130B4 accident near Lahaina, Hawaii, January 5, 2006
On January 5, 2006 at about 7:45 pm local time, a Eurocopter EC 130B4 (helicopter), registered N11QD, was substantially damaged in an accident near Lahaina, Hawaii. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 6 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
An intermittent electrical continuity failure and short of the DECU-XPC wiring harness, which resulted in an uncommanded and an initially undetected engine deceleration and a resulting loss of main rotor rpm. Also causal was the manufacturer's inadequate installation of the wiring harness at the time of manufacture.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 5, 2006 · about 7:45 pm local time
- Place
- Lahaina, Hawaii · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 6 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Eurocopter EC 130B4 · all EC 130B4s on the register
- Registration
- N11QD · registry record · serial 3363
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot reported that he heard the main rotor low speed warning horn, and saw that the rotor speed was decreasing. He entered into an autorotation to make a forced landing and tried to regain engine torque and rotor speed, but was unsuccessful and the low rotor horn sounded again. He lowered the collective and flared for landing. The helicopter came down in trees, with the main rotor blades contacting the treetops. The helicopter was equipped with an on board video recording system that also recorded audio channels. Sound spectrum analysis of the audio recording confirmed the main rotor system speed decay consistent with the pilot's report. The power plant mechanical components: Hydro-Mechanical Unit (HMU), Digital Engine Control Unit (DECU), Engine Back-up Control Ancillary Unit (EBCAU), and Anticipator System Collective Potentiometer (XPC) were tested individually and no abnormalities were found within any component. Visual inspection of the DECU-XPC wiring harness showed very little external damage. Further examination and testing of the wiring harness revealed a loss of internal shielding continuity and shorts between a wire and the shielding. No evidence of lightning strike damage was found in any of the wiring. Faults in the manufacturing assembly of one of the XPC harness backshells were also discovered. Further examination and testing revealed the insulation breakdown was a result of wire damage due to a tight bend in the harness, located about 80 and 90 cm from the rear of the connector (potentiometer side). It was discovered that the AS350B3 and EC130B4 XPC cables (a part of the aircraft wire harness) had been manufactured with extra length to accommodate multiple installation configurations. The length of the accident helicopter's harness was longer than necessary, and it had been bent in a tight radius during aircraft production to accommodate the extra length in during installation. The wiring faults resulted in a gradual, intermittent decay of the XPC signal to the DECU. A review of the DECU design with the manufacturer confirmed that the DECU logic would not detect the XPC signal shift error, such as occurred in this event, which would cause an uncommanded and undetected loss of rotor speed. The aircraft flight manual only contains emergency procedures for a decrease in main rotor speed below 360 rpm when it corresponds with an engine failure. The aircraft flight manual does not address an intermittent XPC signal failure. As a result of the investigation, on March 13, 2009, Eurocopter issued Alert Service Bulletin No. 76.00.18, which called for a modification to eliminate the potential for NR drop in flight - Slow drift in the XPC anticipator (collective pitch signal) on AS350B3 and EC130B4 helicopters.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 13,750 hours in all; 1,703 in this make and model; 200 in the last 90 days; 75 in the last 30 days; 10,960 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: December 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,836 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, December 1, 2005; 38 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,350 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Turbomeca Arriel 2B1 (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Operator: Helicopter Consultants Of Maui, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: OGG Kahului HI at 7:30 pm
- Destination: OGG
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 020° at 15 knots
- Visibility: 15 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 1,000 ft
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 30.17 inHg
- Observation at 6:54 pm from PHOG, 10 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 5 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.