Hughes 369D accident near Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania, September 11, 2025
On September 11, 2025 at about 6:02 pm local time, a 1981 Hughes 369D (helicopter), registered N5072F, was destroyed in an accident during maneuvering (hover) near Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania. It was an external-load flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The NTSB has not yet published a probable cause for this accident. Investigations usually take one to two years; this page updates when the final report is released.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 11, 2025 · about 6:02 pm local time
- Place
- Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Hughes 369D, built 1981 · all 369Ds on the register
- Registration
- N5072F · registry record · serial 811024D
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- External-load flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)
The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record
On September 11, 2025, about 1402 eastern daylight time, a Hughes (McDonnell Douglas) 369D helicopter, N5072F, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania. The commercial pilot and line technician were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 133 external load flight. According to the operator, the helicopter departed a landing zone about 1400 with 45 gallons of Jet-A fuel, to perform work near a 120-ft-tall transmission tower about 1 mile away. The purpose of the flight was to measure and mark sections along a fiber optic wire, located above the transmission wires. Anti-galloping devices (dampers) were to be installed at a later time, on the conductor wire below the fiber optic wire markings. To accomplish this task, the line technician would be positioned on a skid plate, on the left outside of the helicopter, behind the pilot seat, with colored tape. The line technician would then adhere a section of colored tape to the fiber optic wire at the position where the anti-galloping device was to be installed. There were no known witnesses to the accident sequence. Other line technicians, working about 2 miles away, reported feeling and hearing vibrations in the lines about the time of the accident. The wreckage came to rest in a vertical nose-down position adjacent to the transmission tower with severed fiber optic wire, oriented about a 210° magnetic heading. The fuel tank had been breached during impact. A strong odor of Jet-A fuel was present at the accident site. Additionally, residual fuel was noted in the tank and on the ground near the wreckage. Four of the five main rotor blades (MRB) separated from the hub and the tailboom also separated. One MRB remained partially attached to the hub and was curled around the wreckage. Two other MRBs were located in the forward vicinity of the main wreckage. One MRB was bent downward about mid-span, and the other MRB was curled downward near the tip. A section of the fourth MRB was located in a tree aft of the main wreckage, and the fifth MRB was found aft of that, on the ground. The fifth MRB exhibited buckling near the outboard leading edge. A smaller outboard section of MRB was also found about 200 ft forward of the main wreckage. The upper vertical and horizontal stabilizer were located about 70 ft aft of the main wreckage. Sections of the tailboom, tailrotor driveshaft, tailrotor gearbox, lower vertical stabilizer, and separated tailrotor were located together about 40 ft aft of the main wreckage. The tailrotor hub had separated from the tailrotor gearbox and one tailrotor blade remained attached to the hub. It was bent about 45° near the inboard one-third section. The other tailrotor blade separated about 4 in from the root and the inboard leading edge area of the separated section exhibited an impact scrape indentation. The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. He reported a total flight experience of 11,700 hours on his most recent application for a Federal Aviation Administration second-class medical certificate, dated November 25, 2024. According to the operator, of the pilot’s total flight experience, 2,626 hours were in the same make and model as the accident helicopter. The helicopter was manufactured in 1981 and equipped with an Allison (Rolls-Royce) 250-C20R/2, 450-shaft-hp engine. The helicopter was maintained under a manufacturer’s approved inspection program. Its most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on June 21, 2025. At that time, the airframe had accrued 7,985 total hours of operation and the engine had accrued 6,009 total hours of operation. The helicopter had flown 78.2 hours between the inspection and the accident. The wreckage was retained for further examination.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during maneuvering (hover) defining event
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 7,985 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, June 21, 2025; 78 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,000 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Operator: Winco INC
The flight
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
- Altimeter: 30.14 inHg
- Observation at 1:55 pm from 22N, 5 miles away
Weather report (METAR): METAR K22N 111755Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 26/06 A3014 RMK AO2
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 1 | |||
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
