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Accidents · NTSB ERA25FA173 · Preliminary: the investigation is not finished

Cessna 310R accident near Boca Raton, Florida, April 11, 2025

On April 11, 2025 at about 2:23 pm local time, a 1977 Cessna 310R, registered N8930N, was destroyed in an accident during takeoff near Boca Raton, Florida (Boca Raton airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The NTSB has not yet published a probable cause for this accident. Investigations usually take one to two years; this page updates when the final report is released.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 11, 2025 · about 2:23 pm local time
Place
Boca Raton, Florida · Boca Raton · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
3 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 310R, built 1977 · all 310Rs on the register
Registration
N8930N · registry record · serial 310R0986
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On April 11, 2025, at 1023 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 310R, N8930N, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Boca Raton, Florida. The two pilots and the passenger were fatally injured, and one person on the ground sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The accident flight was the first flight after the airplane’s annual inspection had been completed. The airplane departed from the Boca Raton Airport (BCT), Boca Raton, Florida, and was destined for the Tallahassee International Airport (TLH), Tallahassee, Florida. A portion of the airplane’s taxi and departure were captured by airport surveillance video. The video of the taxi revealed that the airplane made several left and right turns as it transitioned to the runup area and runway. The video of the airplane’s takeoff revealed that the airplane maintained the centerline of the runway during the takeoff roll. Shortly after rotation, the airplane yawed to the left and continued in a left turn until the airplane went out of view. The airplane then momentarily reentered the camera frame, as it continued in a left yaw and left turn. Several witnesses captured videos of the airplane while in flight. The videos depicted the airplane in a left yaw at a low altitude. Audio from the videos were consistent with both engines operating. Preliminary ADS-B data revealed that immediately after takeoff, at 1012, the airplane drifted to the left, followed by a left 180° turn, followed by a left 360° turn. The airplane continued making several left 360° turns; the last data point was on the airplane’s 9th turn at 1022 and was 273 ft south of the initial impact point. According to preliminary air traffic control recordings, one of the pilots reported that they were having a problem with the airplane’s rudder and that they could only make left turns. Figure 1. Preliminary ADS-B Flight Track with initial impact point marked. The airplane’s initial impact point was identified to be several trees in the median of a road. The airplane then impacted the road, and the wreckage path continued until the main wreckage site, which was on a set of railroad tracks, about 370 ft from the initial impact point. The furthest piece of wreckage was identified as the left engine and was found 320 ft past the main wreckage location. The wreckage was highly fragmented, and there was a postimpact fire. The fuselage, including the cockpit, sustained significant thermal damage from the postimpact fire, and most of the fuselage and cockpit had been consumed. All the major components of the airplane were located at the accident site. The airplane’s rudder was found near the initial impact point and exhibited impact and thermal damage. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder and displayed minor impact damage. Flight control cable continuity for the right rudder was confirmed and was continuous from the rudder pedal attach point to the rudder bellcrank attach bracket; however, the rudder bellcrank attach bracket had separated from the rest of the bellcrank. There were no visible signs of fretting between the rudder cable attach bracket and the rudder bellcrank. The left rudder cable was fractured near the rudder pedal attach point and at the rudder bellcrank. The separated cable ends exhibited a splayed, broomstrawed appearance, consistent with tension overload separation. Both cables were attached to their correct installation locations. The rudder trim actuator remained attached to the vertical stabilizer, and the rudder trim chain remained attached to the actuator’s sprocket. The rudder trim rod end extension was measured to be 1.5”, which corresponded to 21° trim tab trailing edge right (left rudder). Both rudder trim cables were fractured in the cockpit consistent with tension overload. Flight control continuity for the elevator was established and the elevator control cables were continuous and remained attached to the fuselage elevator sector and the elevator bellcrank. The push/pull rod for the elevator bellcrank to the elevator was impact damaged and fractured, and the push/pull rod for the control column to the elevator sector was impact separated near the elevator sector. The elevator trim actuator displayed impact damage, and the elevator trim chain was detached from the actuator's sprocket. The elevator trim was measured to have a length of 2.0”, which corresponded to 11° trim tab trailing edge up (elevator down). Flight control cable continuity was established for the right aileron from the wing bellcrank to the cockpit controls through breaks that were consistent with tension overload or recovery cuts. Flight control continuity for the left aileron was confirmed through breaks that were consistent with tension overload or recovery cuts. The aileron control cable chains remained attached to the control column and control wheel sprockets. The aileron trim actuator remained attached to its installation point and displayed impact damage signatures. The aileron trim chain remained attached to the aileron trim actuator sprocket and both aileron trim cables were separated and displayed tension overload signatures. The aileron trim actuator was measured to have an extension length of 1.9”, which corresponded to 13° trim tab trailing edge up (right roll). Both engines separated from their installation points and displayed impact damage signatures. The left engine’s No.1 cylinder head had broken free from the cylinder barrel and the crankcase was impact-damaged near the bottom forward portion of the crankcase. The crankshaft could only be rotated a few degrees, and continuity was established between the crankshaft and the camshaft. The right engine’s crankshaft was unable to be rotated which was consistent with the observed impact damage. The Nos. 1- and 5-cylinder heads had broken free from their respective cylinder barrels and were found along the wreckage path. The crankcase had significant impact damage to the forward bottom section of the case, and the forward camshaft gear was visible through the broken crankcase and had partially fractured. The intact cylinders were inspected utilizing a lighted borescope, and the piston faces, cylinder walls, and valve heads displayed normal operating and combustion signatures. The left propeller had separated from the crankshaft propeller flange and was found along the wreckage path. All three propeller blades remained within the propeller hub and displayed impact damage. One propeller blade displayed torsional deformation, leading edge polishing and there were several gouges in the trailing edge. A second propeller blade displayed aft, tip curling, polishing of the cambered side, and gouges in the trailing edge. The third propeller blade displayed aft bending deformation, torsional deformation, and S-bending deformation. The right propeller had separated from the crankshaft propeller flange and was found along the wreckage path. One of the propeller blades had separated from the propeller hub and was found along the wreckage path. The separated propeller blade displayed S-bending deformation and leading edge polishing. The second propeller blade displayed aft bending deformation, tip curling, and S-bending deformation. The third propeller blade displayed S-bending deformation and leading edge polishing. The wreckage was retained for further examination.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during takeoff defining event

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,048.1 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, April 1, 2025; 0.1 hours since
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Destination: TLH Tallahassee FL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 05/2, 6,276 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 350° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 3,000 ft
  • Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.08 inHg
  • Observation at 9:53 am from BCT, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KBCT 111353Z 35005KT 10SM FEW030 26/17 A3008

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig2
Passengers1

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA25FA173.