Beech C23 accident near Midland, Virginia, December 3, 2023
On December 3, 2023 at about 3:48 pm local time, a 1975 Beech C23, registered N76SB, was destroyed in an accident during approach (IFR final approach) near Midland, Virginia (Warrenton-Fauquier Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s decision to descend below the minimum decision altitude of the instrument approach without having the appropriate runway visual references distinctively identified and with the visibility and ceiling below the minimum that was prescribed for the approach, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 3, 2023 · about 3:48 pm local time · cases in 2023
- Place
- Midland, Virginia · Warrenton-Fauquier Airport · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Beech C23, built 1975 · all C23s on the register
- Registration
- N76SB · registry record · serial M-1776
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight and had performed several instrument approaches to two different airports near the departure airport. After performing the practice approaches, the pilot returned to his home airport to perform a final instrument approach and landing. The pilot reported to air traffic control (ATC) that he would cancel his IFR clearance after he descended below the cloud layer surrounding the airport. The pilot never made any emergency declarations to ATC throughout the flight. ADS-B data revealed that the airplane descended toward the runway, and track data was lost about 4,350 ft short of the runway and right of the runway centerline. A video surveillance camera captured the fireball of the impact, as well as audio, which indicated that the engine was operating at a high rpm just before impact. The instrument approach the pilot attempted had a minimum decision altitude (MDA) between 384 and 424 ft above ground level (agl) at the airport; the exact MDA was dependent on the type of equipment the airplane had installed. The instrument approach also required 1 statute mile of visibility. The reported weather at the time of the accident had an overcast ceiling of 300 ft agl, which was below the MDA of the instrument approach. And while the latest reported visibility at the airport was 1.75 miles, the visibility from the surveillance camera was less than 1 mile. The camera visibility was below the minimum requirements for the instrument approach into the airport. Postaccident examination revealed the airplane was destroyed by post-impact fire. Further examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation; the condition of the airplane’s navigational equipment could not be determined due to the extensive fire damage. However, before the accident, the pilot had successfully performed four other area navigation (RNAV) approaches in the local area, indicating the navigational equipment was working correctly during the accident flight. The pilot’s toxicology results indicate he had used the sedating antihistamine medication diphenhydramine. The diphenhydramine level in postmortem iliac blood was low. While possible impairing effects related to diphenhydramine use cannot be entirely excluded, the toxicology results in this case provide no clear evidence that diphenhydramine effects contributed to the accident. The pilot’s elevated carboxyhemoglobin and the detection of cyanide in his blood can be attributed to effects of smoke inhalation during the post-crash fire, and do not constitute evidence of impairing pre-crash exposure.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during approach (IFR final approach) defining event
- Course deviation during approach (IFR initial approach)
- Altitude deviation during approach (IFR final approach)
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Clouds › Decision related to condition
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Drizzle/mist › Decision related to condition
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 628 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,990 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, March 10, 2023
- Maximum gross weight: 2,450 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4K (piston); 2,990 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 33, 5,000 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 1.8 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 300 ft
- Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
- Altimeter: 29.66 inHg
- Observation at 3:55 pm from HWY, 1 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KHWY 032055Z AUTO 00000KT 1 3/4SM BR OVC003 14/13 A2966 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT N T01420127
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Photographs from the investigation 11 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photograph 1 – Tree Damage (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 2 – Main Wreckage (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 3 – Aft Fuselage and Empennage (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 4 – Right Wing Components (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 5 – Propeller and Spinner (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 6 – Engine (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 7 – Engine (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 8 – Propeller Blade (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 9 – Tree Limb (NTSB Photo)
Photograph 10 – Engine Spark Plugs (NTSB Photo)
Photo taken after accident. Cessna 172 was at the Visual Descent Point (VDP). Approximate location of accident site shown by yellow arrow.The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
28 documents, released by the NTSB on December 17, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N76SB on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Beechcraft C23 Sundowner 456 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Beechcraft 6 aircraft on the register
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4K 45 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Warrenton/Fauquier Airport · nearest airport
- Accidents and incidents in Virginia 1,361 since 1982 · 227 in the last ten years
- Virginia 5,982 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA24FA053.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.