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Accidents · NTSB ERA23FA142 · Final report

Piper J3C and Piper PA28 mid-air collision near Winter Haven, Florida, March 7, 2023

On March 7, 2023 at about 7:00 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Piper J3C (N10510) and Piper PA28 (N9221D), were involved in a mid-air collision near Winter Haven, Florida (Winter Haven Rgnl airport). 4 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The failure of both flight crews to see and avoid each other while operating in the airport environment.
The failure of both flight crews to see and avoid each other while operating in the airport environment.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 7, 2023 · about 7:00 pm local time
Place
Winter Haven, Florida · Winter Haven Rgnl · map
Type
Accident · mid-air collision
Injuries
4 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Piper J3C 65, built 1945 · all J3Cs on the register
Registration
N10510 · registry record · serial 45-4942-A
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
Aircraft 2
Piper PA28 161, built 1988 · all PA28s on the register
Registration
N9221D · registry record · serial 2841030
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative for the Piper J3C final · quoted from the NTSB record

A float-equipped J3C was returning to its seaplane base for a water landing after a local flight. A PA-28 was performing power-off 180° landing maneuvers at an airport adjacent to the seaplane base. Shortly after the PA-28 pilot announced a left turn to the base leg over the airport common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), the airplanes collided nearly head-on at 465 ft above ground level. Postaccident examination of both airplanes revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The J3C was not equipped with a radio, nor was it required to be. With no radio in the J3C, neither they nor the crew in the PA-28 would have had any attentional cueing that would have alerted them to the other airplane. Neither airplane was equipped with avionics that would allow for an in-cockpit traffic display and only the PA-28 was equipped with ADS-B out. Review of video evidence from a nearby residence revealed that, given the two flight paths and the nearly head-on impact, the front-seat pilot of the J3C and the right-seat flight instructor of the PA-28 should have been able to detect the other airplane. Both crews efforts to detect the other likely would have been made more difficult by the complex background of sky and ground. The PA-28 flight instructor’s postaccident toxicology testing results indicated that she had used the antihistamine medication cetirizine. Based on the cetirizine levels measured in cavity blood and tissue, it is possible that she may have been experiencing some associated sedation at the time of the accident. Although sedation can adversely affect vigilance, there is no clear evidence that this was a factor in the collision, which plausibly could have occurred in the absence of impairment. Ethanol was detected at a very low level in a postmortem cavity blood specimen from the PA-28 pilot receiving instruction. Ethanol was not detected in his urine. These results indicate that some or all of the detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and that ethanol effects did not likely contribute to the accident. The J3C was not equipped with a radio, nor was it required to be, and was therefore not self-announcing or able to receive transmissions on CTAF. With no radio in the JC3, neither they nor the crew in the PA-28 would have had any attentional cueing that would have alerted them to the other airplane. Neither airplane was equipped with avionics that would allow for an in-cockpit traffic display and only the PA-28 was equipped with ADS-B out. Had both flight crews had access to two-way radios and in-cockpit traffic displays, with ADS-B in and out, they likely would have been better able to see and avoid the impending collision.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Piper PA28 final · quoted from the NTSB record

A float-equipped J3C was returning to its seaplane base for a water landing after a local flight. A PA-28 was performing power-off 180° landing maneuvers at an airport adjacent to the seaplane base. Shortly after the PA-28 pilot announced a left turn to the base leg over the airport common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), the airplanes collided nearly head-on at 465 ft above ground level. Postaccident examination of both airplanes revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The J3C was not equipped with a radio, nor was it required to be. With no radio in the J3C, neither they nor the crew in the PA-28 would have had any attentional cueing that would have alerted them to the other airplane. Neither airplane was equipped with avionics that would allow for an in-cockpit traffic display and only the PA-28 was equipped with ADS-B out. Review of video evidence from a nearby residence revealed that, given the two flight paths and the nearly head-on impact, the front-seat pilot of the J3C and the right-seat flight instructor of the PA-28 should have been able to detect the other airplane. Both crews efforts to detect the other likely would have been made more difficult by the complex background of sky and ground. The PA-28 flight instructor’s postaccident toxicology testing results indicated that she had used the antihistamine medication cetirizine. Based on the cetirizine levels measured in cavity blood and tissue, it is possible that she may have been experiencing some associated sedation at the time of the accident. Although sedation can adversely affect vigilance, there is no clear evidence that this was a factor in the collision, which plausibly could have occurred in the absence of impairment. Ethanol was detected at a very low level in a postmortem cavity blood specimen from the PA-28 pilot receiving instruction. Ethanol was not detected in his urine. These results indicate that some or all of the detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and that ethanol effects did not likely contribute to the accident. The J3C was not equipped with a radio, nor was it required to be, and was therefore not self-announcing or able to receive transmissions on CTAF. With no radio in the JC3, neither they nor the crew in the PA-28 would have had any attentional cueing that would have alerted them to the other airplane. Neither airplane was equipped with avionics that would allow for an in-cockpit traffic display and only the PA-28 was equipped with ADS-B out. Had both flight crews had access to two-way radios and in-cockpit traffic displays, with ADS-B in and out, they likely would have been better able to see and avoid the impending collision.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Piper J3C from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during approach (VFR pattern base) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Student/instructed pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Instructor/check pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; multi-engine sea; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 25,000 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,029 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 16,542.8 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, January 10, 2023; 82.3 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,300 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental C85-12 (piston); 8,172 hours total
  • Operator: Jack Browns Seaplane Base INC

The flight

  • Departed from: F57 Winter Haven FL at 6:05 pm
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 29, 4,001 ft by 60 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 300° at 10 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 4,100 ft
  • Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
  • Observation at 1:53 pm from GIF, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KGIF 071853Z AUTO 30010KT 10SM FEW041 28/17 A3001 RMK AO2 SLP161 T02830172

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig2

The factual record for the Piper PA28 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during approach (VFR pattern base) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Student/instructed pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Instructor/check pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 489 hours in all; 353 in this make and model; 141 in the last 90 days; 449 as pilot in command; 263 on instruments
  • Last flight review: August 1, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 215 hours in all; 90 in this make and model; 165 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: March 3, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (waiver time limited special)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 16,509 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 17, 2023; 23 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,325 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-320-D3G (piston); 9,449 hours total
  • Operator: Sunrise Aviation, Inc

The flight

  • Departed from: LAL Lakeland FL at 6:27 pm
  • Flight plan: none
  • A second pilot was aboard

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig2

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA23FA142.