Piper PA-28-140B accident near Panama City, Florida, April 18, 2022

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Before the accident flight, the airplane had been started and taxied, but not flown in several years, and had been stored outdoors during that time. The pilot was aware of the condition and history of the airplane and conducted a cockpit orientation and cursory review of the onboard paperwork with the airplane’s owner. The pilot subsequently checked the fuel and oil to assure that they were at the proper levels and that no water or debris was indicated by samples from the drain ports. The pilot and the mechanic (who had performed the only recorded maintenance and inspection on the airplane in the previous 5 years) planned to take a short flight in the general vicinity of the airfield and then land. The weight and balance were within limits, and there was about 25 gallons of fuel on board. Ground operations were unremarkable. All the electrical gauges were within limits and the battery indicated that it was charged. The engine ran smooth, and all indications were within limits. The pilot stated that before takeoff, he decided to perform the pre-takeoff checks twice - each followed by a high-speed taxi down the runway to rotation speed. “The aircraft performed flawlessly” and he then then did a final runup and magneto check, lined up, advanced to full throttle, and began the takeoff roll. The airplane accelerated and became airborne as expected, but as they approached the departure end of the runway the engine rpm suddenly decreased to about 2,400 rpm and airspeed began to decrease. He ensured the mixture was full rich and the throttle was full in. He believed that the engine was running fine, but at reduced rpm. The engine rpm then decreased to 2,100 rpm. He then checked that the throttle was full in, the mixture was rich, the primer was in, and the fuel pump was on, as he lowered the nose to maintain airspeed. However, engine rpm began to decrease as if he was slowly pulling the throttle to idle. The engine was not running rough, just slowly decreasing uncommanded to idle (and at this point the propeller was likely windmilling). As they approached a highway, they were in a descent below best glide speed. He realized he would not be able to turn and try to land on the highway without stalling. They were descending at such a rate that they could not make it to a nearby road or some small clearings just south of it, so he aimed between pine trees and tried to align the airplane’s flight path with the planted pattern of the trees and prepared for a forced landing. Just above the treetops, he slowed to stall speed and attempted to use rudder to keep the wings level as the wings impacted the trees to slow them down before the airplane came to rest. During the impact sequence, the airplane was substantially damaged. Postaccident examination revealed that the engine displayed numerous areas of corrosion, missing paint, and a wasp nest was adhered to the accessory case. Water was discovered in the gascolator and boost pump, which upon further examination was determined to not be an approved boost pump. Corrosion was present in the engine-driven fuel pump, and the carburetor fuel inlet screen displayed several areas where corrosion and debris were adhering to the screen. Further examination also revealed water in the carburetor float bowl. Based on this information it is likely the engine sustained a complete loss of engine power due to fuel contamination. The airplane Owner’s Handbook stated under “PREFLIGHT” that the airplane should be given a thorough visual inspection before each flight, including visually checking the fuel supply, securing the fuel caps, draining the fuel tank sumps, checking that the fuel system vents were open, checking for obvious fuel and oil leaks, and checking that the required papers were in order and in the airplane. Under “GROUND CHECK” (which occurs after the engine is started), it also required that the pilot check the magnetos, vacuum indicator, oil temperature, oil pressure, and carburetor heat, as well as turning the electric fuel pump off momentarily to determine that the engine-driven fuel pump was functional. Just before takeoff, it required that the pilot check that the fuel was on the proper tank, the electric fuel pump was “ON,” the engine gauges were checked, the carburetor heat was “OFF,” the mixture was “RICH,” the quadrant friction knob was set, the wing flaps were set, the trim was set, the controls were free, the door was latched, and the belts/harnesses were fastened. The pilot purportedly accomplished all these checks twice—each followed by a high-speed taxi down the runway to rotation speed—and then performed a final runup and magneto check before takeoff. However, examination of the tachometer hour meter indicated that the time from engine start to the loss of power was only about 2 tenths of an hour (approximately 12 minutes at cruise rpm). Examination of airplane maintenance records revealed that the mechanic inspected and serviced the airplane about 4 days before the accident. The entry in the airplane maintenance records made no mention of an annual inspection. Further examination revealed that an annual inspection had occurred about 6 years prior. During that inspection, 19 discrepancies were discovered and the “airframe was determined to be UNAIRWORTHY.” About 14 months later, a document was produced by a mechanic that listed the 19 discrepancies found during the annual inspection, and that they had been remediated. However, the document did not state that an annual inspection had been completed. No other maintenance entries were found in the airplane maintenance records after the document was produced from about 5 years until the entry that occurred 4 days before the accident, and a review of the engine maintenance records revealed that the most recent engine overhaul was completed more than 50 years before the accident. Review of the manufacturer’s published guidance for 100 hour/annual inspections indicated that approximately 174 checklist items were required to be checked/inspected during a 100 hour/annual inspection. About 18 of the checklist items had to do with inspection of the fuel system, including checking the wing tanks and fuel lines, the gascolator, boost pump, engine-driven fuel pump, carburetor inlet screen, and carburetor. Additional review of the “GENERAL” section also revealed that one checklist item stated, “Appropriate entries made in the Aircraft and Engine Logbooks” and another stated, “Airworthiness & Registration Certificates in the aircraft and properly displayed.” The pilot had accrued about 3,870 total hours of flying experience, 3,182 hours of which was as pilot in command. However, most of the pilot’s total flight hours were in several turbojet powered airplanes, and, at the time of the accident, he had no flight hours in the accident airplane make and model. Although he was transitioning to an unfamiliar airplane, he did not seek specific training in the new airplane’s systems and operating characteristics to include normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures. Thus, the evidence indicates that the mechanic should have been familiar with the scope and details to be included in annual and 100-hour inspections, and should have been familiar with the general items to be checked during inspections, but due to the airplane’s maintenance history and his inadequate inspection the contamination in the fuel system was not detected. Also, the pilot, who was the last barrier in preventing the accident and was aware of his lack of experience in the airplane, did not seek specific training, was either unaware of or ignored the risks inherent in flying an airplane that had not flown in many years, and either rushed or performed an incomplete preflight inspection and runup, which resulted in him failing to detect the contaminated fuel.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

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