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Accidents · NTSB ERA18FA264 · Final report

Dassault FALCON 50 accident near Greenville, South Carolina, September 27, 2018

On September 27, 2018 at about 5:46 pm local time, a 1980 Dassault FALCON 50, registered N114TD, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Greenville, South Carolina (Greenville Downtown airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 2 people were killed and 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The operator's decision to allow a flight in an airplane with known, unresolved maintenance discrepancies, and the flight crew's failure to properly configure the airplane in a way that would have allowed the emergency or parking brake systems to stop the airplane during landing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 27, 2018 · about 5:46 pm local time
Place
Greenville, South Carolina · Greenville Downtown · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed and 2 people were seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Dassault FALCON 50 Undesignat, built 1980 · all FALCON 50s on the register
Registration
N114TD · no longer on the register · serial 17
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The flight crew was operating the business jet on an on-demand air taxi flight with passengers onboard. During landing at the destination airport, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the sound of the airplane touching down followed by the pilot's and copilot's comments that the brakes were not operating. Air traffic controllers reported, and airport surveillance video confirmed, that the airplane touched down "normally" and the airplane's thrust reverser deployed but that the airplane continued down the runway without decelerating before overrunning the runway and impacting terrain. Post-accident examination of the airplane's brake system revealed discrepancies of the antiskid system that included a broken solder joint on the left-side inboard transducer and a reversal of the wiring on the right-side outboard transducer. It is likely that these discrepancies resulted in the normal braking system's failure to function during the landing. Before the accident flight, the airplane had been in long-term storage for several years and was in the process of undergoing maintenance to bring the airplane back to a serviceable condition, which in-part required the completion of several inspections, an overhaul of the landing gear, and the resolution of over 100 other unresolved discrepancies. The accident flight and four previous flights were all made with only a portion of this required maintenance having been completed and properly documented in the airplane's maintenance logs. A pilot, who had flown the airplane on four previous flights along with the accident pilot (who was acting as second-in-command during them), identified during those flights that the airplane's normal braking system was not operating when the airplane was traveling faster than 20 knots. He remedied the situation by configuring the airplane to use the emergency, rather than normal, braking system. That pilot reported this discrepancy to the operator's director of maintenance, and it is likely that maintenance personnel from the company subsequently added an "INOP" placard near the switch on the date of the accident. The label on the placard referenced the antiskid system, and the airplane's flight manual described that with the normal brake (or antiskid) system inoperative, the brake selector switch must be positioned to use the emergency braking system. Following the accident, the switch was found positioned with the normal braking system activated, and it is likely that the accident flight crew attempted to utilize the malfunctioning normal braking system during the landing. Additionally, the flight crew failed to properly recognize the failure and configure the airplane to utilize the emergency braking system, or utilize the parking brake, as described in the airplane's flight manual, in order to stop the airplane within the available runway.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft inspection event during prior to flight
  2. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during landing (landing roll) defining event
  3. Runway excursion during landing (landing roll)
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during after landing

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Brake › Failure
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › Scheduled maint checks › Not serviced/maintained
  • cause Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Documentation/record keeping › Maintenance records › Operator
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Flt operations/dispatcher
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Flight crew

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 11,650 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
  • Flight time: 5,500 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 14,002.8 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, August 27, 2014; 0 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 40,780 lb
  • Seats: 12
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Honeywell TFE-731 (turbofan); 13,244 hours total
  • Engine 2: Honeywell TFE-731 (turbofan); 13,451 hours total
  • Engine 3: Honeywell TFE-731 (turbofan); 12,302 hours total
  • Operator: Air America Flight Services INC

The flight

  • Departed from: PIE St Petersburg-Clearwater FL at 4:30 pm
  • Destination: GMU Greenville SC
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 19, 5,393 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 210° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
  • Observation at 5:53 pm from KGMU

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.