Enstrom F 28A accident near Memphis, Tennessee, January 29, 2014
On January 29, 2014 at about 9:15 pm local time, a 1971 Enstrom F 28A (helicopter), registered N24RB, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near Memphis, Tennessee (General Dewitt Spain airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A skid tube clamp weld failure due to high residual stress, which resulted in a skid collapse during landing. Contributing to the accident was the airplane manufacturer’s lack of adequate guidance for periodically inspecting the skid tube clamp.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 29, 2014 · about 9:15 pm local time
- Place
- Memphis, Tennessee · General Dewitt Spain · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Enstrom F 28A A, built 1971 · all F 28As on the register
- Registration
- N24RB · registry record · serial 057
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight instructor reported that he and the student pilot were practicing running landings with a simulated stuck antitorque pedal. At touchdown, the left landing skid collapsed, and the helicopter subsequently came to rest in a forward-pitch attitude. Postaccident examination of the landing skid revealed that the skid clamp that connects the forward cross tube to the landing gear skid had failed due to fatigue cracking that had initiated in the heat-affected zone adjacent to a weld. The fatigue cracks then propagated inward through the clamp. After the clamp fractured, the bolt hole ring that connected the clamp to the fuselage frame failed in overstress, which caused the landing gear skid to fail. Hardness testing revealed that the weld material, clamp, and ring, significantly differed in hardness. Materials joined with a broad hardness gradient are likely to contain high residual stresses, which in this case, would have been concentrated at the boundary between the clamp and the weld and led to a failure of the weld when the landing load was applied. Because multiple crack initiation sites were found in areas without material defects, the fatigue crack that led to the leg failure probably developed and propagated over a long time under numerous low-stress cycles. The airplane manufacturer placed no life or event limits (hard landing) for replacing landing gear skid tube clamps; it only required periodic visual inspections of the skid tube clamps, which was not adequate for detection of the fatigue cracking because the weld cracks were not visible and could only have been detected by magnetic particle or dye penetrant inspection.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Simulated/training event during landing
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event
- Landing gear collapse during landing (flare/touchdown)
- Nose over/nose down during landing (flare/touchdown)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear attach sec › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › Scheduled maint checks › Not installed/available
- factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Manufacturer
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 5,260 hours in all; 2,000 in this make and model; 52 in the last 90 days; 19 in the last 30 days; 5,005 as pilot in command; 1,825 on instruments
- Last flight review: August 1, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 225 hours in all; 142 in this make and model; 7 in the last 90 days; 141 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: August 6, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 10,760 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, November 22, 2013
- Maximum gross weight: 2,150 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming HIO 360 C1A (piston); 6,954 hours total
- Operator: Helicopters INC
The flight
- Departed from: M01 Memphis TN at 7:40 pm
- Destination: M01 Memphis TN
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 25,000 ft
- Temperature: 34°F (1°C), dew point 1°F (-17°C)
- Altimeter: 30.37 inHg
- Observation at 8:54 pm from MEM, 9 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.