Beech 58 accident near Lagrange, Georgia, July 11, 2010
On July 11, 2010 at about 1:15 pm local time, a Beech 58, registered N405RW, was substantially damaged in an accident during standing (engine(s) start-up) near Lagrange, Georgia (Lagrange-Callaway airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot not allowing sufficient time for fuel spill vapors to dissipate before starting the engine. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate maintenance of the fuel cap.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 11, 2010 · about 1:15 pm local time
- Place
- Lagrange, Georgia · Lagrange-Callaway · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech 58 TC · all 58s on the register
- Registration
- N405RW · no longer on the register · serial TH325
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane had just been fueled by the lineman at the fixed-base operator (FBO), who secured the fuel caps after the service. During the climb after takeoff, the right-wing fuel cap came off of the wing, remaining attached only by the chain. An estimated 11 gallons of fuel was siphoned from the wing before the pilot returned to the airport and taxied back to the FBO. The pilot secured the cap and conducted a visual inspection of the right wing, before attempting to start the engine again. The right engine backfired, followed by a loud bang and whoosh sound; flames then rose from the right wing. A postaccident examination of the right wing revealed that the internal blast was a result of the backfire igniting fuel vapors that remained after the siphoning. The blast caused the upper wing skin to expand and separate from the retaining rivets. A soot trail originated at the exhaust pipes and traveled in an aft direction to the trailing edge of the wing. Examination of the fuel cap revealed that the outer o-ring was dry and cracked, a washer was missing, the cap leaked under pressure, and that the force required to secure the cap exceeded the manufacturer’s specification. The airplane’s maintenance records did not indicate the last time the fuel cap was overhauled. Fuel cap maintenance is permissible by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified airframe mechanic or by an FAA-approved overhaul facility. While the cap’s manufacturer has standards on the required forces to secure the fuel cap lock tab and a leak testing process, the airplane’s maintenance manual does not mention either. As a result of separate investigations, the airplane’s manufacturer has included in applicable airplanes’ maintenance manuals the following verbiage: “Note: Inspect the fuel filler cap outer o-ring for flexibility, splits cracks or distortion. If the o-ring is damaged in any way replace or overhaul the fuel cap.”
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during initial climb
- Fuel related during initial climb
- Explosion (non-impact) during standing (engine(s) start-up) defining event
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during standing (engine(s) start-up)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel storage › Incorrect service/maintenance
- Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Document/info production › Manufacturer
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 30,510 hours in all; 215 in this make and model; 27 in the last 90 days; 12 in the last 30 days; 18,000 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: July 21, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,139 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 20, 2009; 100 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,400 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Continental IO-520-C (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Continental IO-520-C (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: LGC Lagrange GA at 1:15 pm
- Destination: SAV Savannah GA
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 84°F (29°C)
- Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
- Observation at 1:15 pm from LGC
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.