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Accidents · NTSB DCA24LA200 · Final report

Aergility ATLIS 1 accident near Dunnellon, Florida, May 24, 2024

On May 24, 2024 at about 2:22 pm local time, a 2024 Aergility ATLIS 1 (powered-lift aircraft), registered N237KG, was substantially damaged in an accident during uncontrolled descent near Dunnellon, Florida (Marion County Airport). It was a flight test under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

An intermittent electrical failure that switched two motor controllers off, resulting in a loss of hover capability and impact with the ground.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 24, 2024 · about 2:22 pm local time
Place
Dunnellon, Florida · Marion County Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Aergility ATLIS 1, built 2024
Registration
N237KG · no longer on the register · serial A000001
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight test · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

An Aergility ATLIS 1 experimental unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), operated by Aergility Corporation and registered as N273KG, sustained substantial damage during a hard landing at Marion County Airport, Dunnellon, Florida. The flight was operated by Aergility as a flight test within airport property and was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 and a Federal Aviation Administration Certificate of Authorization (COA). There were no injuries. The ATLIS is a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) cargo UAV currently under development by the Aergility corporation. The Aergility ATLIS UAV is equipped with six rotors with electric motors powered by batteries for vertical take-off and landing, and a turboprop propulsion engine and propeller for forward flight (see figure 1). Rotor speed (RPM) is always controlled by the autopilot to manage attitude and altitude control. The turboprop engine provides the power for forward flight and an engine driven starter/generator provides power for recharging the batteries. The accident occurred during the 16th test flight of the test program, and the fourth flight of the day. At this point in the flight test program, only hover and very slow forward flight testing had been performed with the UAV. The purpose of this flight was to examine the performance of hover when incorporating a change in center of gravity (c.g.) location within the c.g. range of the UAV. The turboprop engine for forward flight was not in use for this test, and the propeller was strapped in the “X” position. According to the operator, the UAV was being piloted in manual mode, where pilot inputs command roll angle, pitch angle, yaw rate, and vertical rate. Approximately 45 seconds into the flight, while hovering at about 15 feet above ground level (AGL), the UAV executed a planned 90-degree clockwise heading change over the takeoff location. Shortly afterward, an audible reduction in rotor RPM was noted, and the UAV began to descend. The pilot immediately input control to increase vertical rate, but the descent continued. The UAV remained level and maintained heading throughout the descent to the ground. Despite the pilot’s input to counter the descent, the descent rate was not arrested. Autopilot sensor data showed the aircraft contacted the ground at 6.8 meters/second descent rate. Figure 1. Atlis Aergility UAV. (Source: Aergility Corporation) Upon contact with the ground, the landing gear skids collapsed, and the wings deflected downward about 10-15 degrees from the normal dihedral, breaking the spars just outside the fuselage spar box. After the wing spars had broken, the wingtip rotors lifted each wing, rotating vertically around the spars until they collided directly above the fuselage, causing significant damage to the rotors, wings and booms. The fuselage experienced only minor damage. The turboprop engine was undamaged, and one of the 4 blades of the turboprop propeller was damaged. Examination of telemetry data logs and systems information revealed that all motor controllers were operating in the normal range, when the front right and left rear motor controllers simultaneously switched to the “OFF” state. The autopilot had not yet incorporated an algorithm to detect and react to a motor controller shutdown and increase thrust, and the autopilot was prioritizing roll, pitch and yaw control. As a result, the UAV was unable to maintain hover with 2 of the 6 motors shut down, yet did impact the ground in a stable pitch, roll and yaw attitude. Examination of onboard data logs and telemetry data logs of the systems information showed the data recording was active through the engine 2 and 6 shutdown, the subsequent ground impact and the resulting wing structural failure. However, the data did not reveal any error message or anomalous data related to the simultaneous shutdown of the 2 motor controllers. Examination of the hardware and electrical circuits of the accident aircraft did not reveal any evidence of failures or electrical shorts in any of the electrical systems, wiring, connections, or busses. Several conditions were identified that could have caused the motor electronic speed controllers to switch to “OFF”. The two motor controllers correctly transmitted telemetry messages following the switch to the “OFF” state indicating they were still functioning, and subsequent testing of the two motor controllers found no fault or failure in either of the two motor controllers. A short intermittent open condition could cause both controllers to switch to “OFF”, but there was no evidence in either the flight logs or hardware to conclusively identify the cause of the open condition in this accident, indicating the condition that switched off the controllers was a very brief transient electrical event. As a result of this accident, the operator/manufacturer implemented improvements to the motor controller logic to help prevent a similar event by increasing sampling of any error conditions before issuing a command to switch the motor off. For non-transient events, the controller will now reduce power before depowering when appropriate, and to re-evaluate command thresholds values. Additionally, for future flights telemetry data will include comparison with error thresholds, and multiple reporting messages when thresholds are exceeded.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during uncontrolled descent defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine controls › Eng cntl sys wiring › Malfunction

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 94 hours in all; 2 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: September 21, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: none
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 447 hours in all; 0 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: May 15, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: none
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, April 29, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,650 lb
  • Seats: 0
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 2: Turbotech Sas TP-R90 (turboprop); 5 hours total
  • Engine 3: Emrax Electric (X6) 2280HV+42%-1U (electric); 5 hours total

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 80°F (27°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

1 document, released by the NTSB on September 3, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.