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Accidents · NTSB CEN25LA208 · Final report

Beech E90 accident near New Century, Kansas, June 16, 2025

On June 16, 2025 at about 6:15 pm local time, a 1979 Beech E90, registered N1UC, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern base) near New Century, Kansas (New Century Aircenter Airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The flight instructor’s inadequate fuel planning that resulted in a loss of engine power to the left engine due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor’s inadequate supervision of the flight that resulted in diminished airplane performance during the go-around.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 16, 2025 · about 6:15 pm local time
Place
New Century, Kansas · New Century Aircenter Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech E90, built 1979 · all E90s on the register
Registration
N1UC · registry record · serial LW-140
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The flight instructor and pilot-receiving-instruction were conducting a cross-country flight in the twin-engine turboprop airplane. According to the flight instructor, while in the airport traffic pattern at the destination airport, the pilot-receiving-instruction allowed the airplane to decelerate below a normal airspeed for the turn from base leg to final approach. He told the pilot-receiving-instruction to increase engine power to accelerate, but the airplane began to yaw left after the engine throttles were increased. The flight instructor “suspected that the left engine flamed out due to fuel starvation” and took control of the airplane. He retracted the landing gear and flaps, applied full right rudder, and rolled the airplane to the right into the operating right engine. The flight instructor did not feather the left propeller because he believed the left engine was still producing limited thrust. The airplane continued in the left turn despite the flight instructor’s corrective actions. The fight instructor did not attempt to turn the airplane back toward the runway because he believed the airplane was accelerating and would clear the hangar ahead of them. The airplane impacted the hangar and came to rest on the roof. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage, both wings, and the right engine separated from the mounts. There was no evidence of a fuel spill in, on, or around the hangar. Examination of the airplane fuel tanks confirmed they were not breached during the accident. When drained, the left- and right-wing fuel tanks contained about 3 fluid ounces and about 30 fluid ounces of fuel, respectively. Although the flight instructor and pilot-receiving-instruction provided different accounts of how much fuel was present before the flight, both pilots stated that the indicated fuel level was within the yellow caution band on both fuel tank gauges before departure. According to the Beech E90 airplane flight manual, takeoffs are prohibited when the fuel tank gauge indications are within the yellow caution band (0 to 260 lbs). Ultimately, the exact amount of fuel available before the flight could not be determined with any certainty. The flight instructor estimated that the 16-minute flight required between 135 to 200 lbs of fuel. The flight instructor opined that the fuel tank gauges were inaccurate which resulted in fuel exhaustion to the left engine. Review of ADS-B flight track data revealed the airplane decelerated below minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) during the turn from base leg to final approach. The airplane continued to decelerate during the go-around. The flight instructor stated that the accident could have been prevented had the airplane’s best single-engine rate-of-climb airspeed (VYSE) been maintained until the runway and landing were ensured. Based on the amount of fuel recovered after the accident, there was likely insufficient fuel remaining to perform a go-around and reenter the traffic pattern for landing with one engine operating.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel exhaustion during approach (VFR pattern base) defining event
  2. Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR go-around)
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during approach (VFR go-around)

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Related operating info
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Engine out capability › Not attained/maintained
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Instructor/check pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring equip/instruments › Instructor/check pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance › Instructor/check pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 795 hours in all; 9 in this make and model; 94.8 in the last 90 days; 36.8 in the last 30 days; 711 as pilot in command; 470 on instruments
  • Last flight review: July 13, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, flight engineer
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 40,000 hours in all; 750 in this make and model; 180 in the last 90 days; 60 in the last 30 days; 35,000 as pilot in command; 800 on instruments
  • Last flight review: January 25, 2025
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 11,437.9 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 7, 2025; 696 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 10,100 lb
  • Seats: 12
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-28 (turboprop); 2,352 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-28 (turboprop); 4,526 hours total
  • Operator: L And P Air LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: KBUM Butler MO at 6:00 pm
  • Destination: KIXD New Century KS
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 18, 7,339 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 180° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 3,400 ft
  • Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
  • Observation at 12:53 pm from KIXD, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KIXD 161753Z 18004KT 10SM BKN034 28/19 A2998 RMK AO2 SLP140 T02830194 10283 20194 58002

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig2

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN25LA208.