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Accidents · NTSB CEN24LA137 · Final report

Enstrom Helicopter CORP 280C accident near Port Lavaca, Texas, March 16, 2024

On March 16, 2024 at about 9:45 pm local time, a 1977 Enstrom Helicopter CORP 280C, registered N280WR, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (hover) near Port Lavaca, Texas. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s improper manual engine mixture management which resulted in a loss of power. Contributing to the accident was the mechanic’s improper setting of the idle mixture adjustment and the pilot’s decision to take off with a known mechanical deficiency.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 16, 2024 · about 9:45 pm local time
Place
Port Lavaca, Texas · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Enstrom Helicopter CORP 280C, built 1977 · all 280Cs on the register
Registration
N280WR · registry record · serial 1108
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that he was repositioning the helicopter from his yard to a raised landing platform. When he initiated a hover to maneuver to the platform, the overboost warning light illuminated, the engine subsequently lost power, and the helicopter settled with only the right skid on the platform. The helicopter then rolled to the left, and the main rotor blades contacted the ground. The pilot reported that the overboost warning light had illuminated during a previous liftoff that day but that reducing manifold pressure had effectively extinguished the light.   According to maintenance records, the idle mixture adjustment had been adjusted during the last annual inspection about 7 flight hours before the accident. Although the Rotorcraft Flight Manual stated that the mixture control must be in the full-rich position for takeoff and landing operations (to ensure adequate engine cooling), the pilot reported that, following this maintenance, he had to manually lean the cockpit mixture control during idle and low-power operations to prevent the engine from running excessively rich. Postaccident examination of the engine found that the idle mixture adjustment was set excessively rich. No other preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions were found with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. According to Enstrom Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 0069, excessively rich idle mixture settings can result in engine roughness and engine stoppage following reductions to low-power conditions. These characteristics are consistent with the pilot’s reported need to manually lean the mixture during idle operation after the most recent maintenance. Because the pilot reported routinely leaning the cockpit mixture control during low-power operations after the maintenance was performed, it is likely that the mixture control was not returned to the full-rich position before repositioning to the landing platform landing pad, which resulted in an overly lean condition and power loss. It is likely that the over boost light illuminated due to the lean mixture which resulted in abnormally high exhaust gas temperature and led to turbocharger overspeed.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during maneuvering (hover)
  2. Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown)
  3. Loss of engine power (partial) during maneuvering (hover) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel control/carburetor › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • Environmental issues › Task environment › Physical workspace › Controls and displays › Response/compensation
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 2,289.1 hours in all; 175 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: February 5, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,713.3 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, December 15, 2023; 7 hours since
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming HIO-360-E1AD (piston); 1,713 hours total

The flight

  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 180° at 11 knots, gusting 16
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 64°F (18°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.83 inHg
  • Observation at 4:55 pm from KPKV, 4 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KPKV 162155Z AUTO 18011G16KT 10SM CLR 30/18 A2983 RMK AO2 T02970177

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

12 documents, released by the NTSB on May 21, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.