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Accidents · NTSB CEN16LA027 · Final report

Bell 407 accident near San Antonio, Texas, November 3, 2015

On November 3, 2015 at about 1:23 am local time, a 1999 Bell 407 (helicopter), registered N496AE, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (hover) near San Antonio, Texas (San Antonio International airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The failure of the No. 3 tail rotor adapter and shaft due to a loss of torque on the retaining nut. Contributing to the accident was the lack of a requirement to inspect the tail rotor assembly for security in the helicopter manufacturer's maintenance manual and the operator's approved aircraft inspection program.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 3, 2015 · about 1:23 am local time · cases in 2015
Place
San Antonio, Texas · San Antonio International · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell 407, built 1999 · all 407s on the register
Registration
N496AE · registry record · serial 53328
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot was conducting an emergency medical services flight. The pilot reported that, when he climbed the helicopter to a 3-ft hover, he heard a loud bang, and the helicopter began an uncommanded right yaw. The pilot applied full left pedal, but this did not arrest the yaw. The pilot then lowered the collective, and the helicopter touched down and then rotated 270 degrees to the right before it came to a stop. The tail rotor was examined, and it could be manually rotated, but a grinding noise could be heard coming from the damaged No. 3 hanger bearing. The main rotor blades did not rotate in synchronization with the tail rotor blades. The No. 3 tail rotor shaft adapter and shaft splines were completely ground down, the adapter and shaft had failed, and there was evidence of excessive torsion beyond the intended allowable tolerances. The aluminum adapter washer hole was elongated, consistent with a loose through bolt, and the drive shaft through bolt had worn threads. There was a 1/8-inch gap between the adapter and the base of the hanger bearing, consistent with the adapter not being fully in contact with the bearing and potential stress within the adapter and shaft splines. The retaining nut had migrated almost .025 inch outward and was very loose, consistent with the loss of torque, which would have allowed movement between the tail rotor adapter and shaft and led to their eventual failure. A review of the helicopter maintenance manual and operator's approved aircraft inspection program revealed that neither had a requirement for the tail rotor assembly to be inspected for security.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft structural failure during maneuvering (hover) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor drive system › Tail rotor drive shaft › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor drive system › Tail rotor drive shaft › Failure
  • factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Manufacturer
  • factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Operator

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 2,201 hours in all; 28 in this make and model; 97 in the last 90 days; 2,626 in the last 30 days; 1,207 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: October 15, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 7,939 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, November 2, 2015
  • Maximum gross weight: 5,250 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rolls Royce M250-C47B (turboshaft); 4,162 hours total
  • Operator: Air Evac Ems, Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: KSAT San Antonio TX at 1:23 am
  • Destination: XS83 San Antonio TX

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 130° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 54°F (12°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.95 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

6 documents, released by the NTSB on March 10, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/CEN16LA027.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.