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Accidents · NTSB CEN14LA036 · Final report

Cessna 182L and Cessna 185F mid-air collision near Superior, Wisconsin, November 2, 2013

On November 2, 2013 at about 10:50 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Cessna 182L (N70520) and Cessna 185F (N94059), were involved in a mid-air collision near Superior, Wisconsin (Richard I Bong Airport). 1 person had minor injuries; 10 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The failure of the pilot who was flying the trail airplane to maintain separation from the lead airplane. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate pilot training for formation skydiving operations.
The failure of the pilot who was flying the trail airplane to maintain separation from the lead airplane. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate pilot training for formation skydiving operations.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 2, 2013 · about 10:50 pm local time
Place
Superior, Wisconsin · Richard I Bong Airport · map
Type
Accident · mid-air collision
Injuries
1 person had minor injuries; 10 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Cessna 182L, built 1968 · all 182Ls on the register
Registration
N70520 · no longer on the register · serial 18259286
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Skydiving flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
Aircraft 2
Cessna 185F, built 1977 · all 185Fs on the register
Registration
N94059 · registry record · serial 18503275
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Skydiving flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 182L final · quoted from the NTSB record

A Cessna 182L (182), the lead airplane, and a Cessna 185F (185), the trail airplane, collided during a formation skydiving flight. Both pilots flew the airplanes in a rectangular pattern until they reached the jump altitude of 12,700 ft mean sea level. The 182 pilot established a jump heading and visually confirmed that the 185 was to the left side and aft of the 182. The 182 pilot then called out "door open" and jumpers "climbing out." Subsequently, the four skydivers on board the 182 climbed out onto the airplane's right wing strut and right wheel step. Almost immediately, the 182 was struck by the 185. The 182's windshield was shattered, and the airplane entered an uncontrollable descent. During the descent, the right wing separated from the airplane, and the right wing fuel tank exploded. The 182 pilot exited the airplane and parachuted safely to the ground. The 185 pilot reported that "when it was time for the skydivers to climb out, the two planes began to drift together and in seemingly no time at all, the two were colliding." After the collision, the skydivers on board the 185 jumped from the airplane as it inverted; the pilot was able to recover the airplane and land. During postaccident interviews, the pilots of both airplanes and the operator's chief pilot reported that, before the flight, they briefed that the trail airplane would be positioned on the left side of the lead airplane. However, each of the three pilots differently described the expected lateral and vertical separation between the trail airplane and the lead airplane. The 182 pilot described the trail position as 20 to 30 ft aft of the lead airplane on a 45-degree bearing and lower than the lead airplane. The 185 pilot described the trail position as one to two airplane lengths (about 26 to 52 ft) aft and left of the lead airplane and at the same altitude as the lead airplane. The chief pilot described the trail position as three airplane lengths (about 78 ft) aft and left of the lead airplane and slightly lower than the lead airplane. Even though none of the pilots stated that the trail airplane should be flown higher than the lead airplane, a video taken of the flight showed that the trail airplane pilot flew the trail airplane higher than the lead airplane until impact. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not provide any guidance to pilots on how to fly skydiving formation flights nor does it require skydiving operators to provide skydiving pilot training or skydiving formation pilot training. The skydiving operator did not provide its pilots skydiving formation flight training, and it did not keep records of pilot training nor was it required to do so by the FAA. The United States Parachute Association published an article titled, "Formation Flying 101: A Guide for Jump Pilots" that provided guidelines for skydiving formation flights, including, in part, that the trail airplane should be within 100 ft of the lead airplane; however, it did not specify that the trail airplane should be lower than the lead airplane. The article did state that altitude separation is the No. 1 way to avoid a collision and that the trail airplane pilot has only one thing to do–hold position relative to the lead aircraft and never lose sight of it. It is essential that pilots flying skydiving operation formation flights have adequate training to conduct the flights properly and ensure the safety of their passengers. If both pilots had received adequate skydiving formation flight training, they might have had a consensus about how the formation flight should have been flown. If the trail airplane pilot had received such training, he might have been more vigilant about maintaining adequate lateral and vertical separation from the lead airplane during the flight.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 185F final · quoted from the NTSB record

A Cessna 182L (182), the lead airplane, and a Cessna 185F (185), the trail airplane, collided during a formation skydiving flight. Both pilots flew the airplanes in a rectangular pattern until they reached the jump altitude of 12,700 ft mean sea level. The 182 pilot established a jump heading and visually confirmed that the 185 was to the left side and aft of the 182. The 182 pilot then called out "door open" and jumpers "climbing out." Subsequently, the four skydivers on board the 182 climbed out onto the airplane's right wing strut and right wheel step. Almost immediately, the 182 was struck by the 185. The 182's windshield was shattered, and the airplane entered an uncontrollable descent. During the descent, the right wing separated from the airplane, and the right wing fuel tank exploded. The 182 pilot exited the airplane and parachuted safely to the ground. The 185 pilot reported that "when it was time for the skydivers to climb out, the two planes began to drift together and in seemingly no time at all, the two were colliding." After the collision, the skydivers on board the 185 jumped from the airplane as it inverted; the pilot was able to recover the airplane and land. During postaccident interviews, the pilots of both airplanes and the operator's chief pilot reported that, before the flight, they briefed that the trail airplane would be positioned on the left side of the lead airplane. However, each of the three pilots differently described the expected lateral and vertical separation between the trail airplane and the lead airplane. The 182 pilot described the trail position as 20 to 30 ft aft of the lead airplane on a 45-degree bearing and lower than the lead airplane. The 185 pilot described the trail positon as one to two airplane lengths (about 26 to 52 ft) aft and left of the lead airplane and at the same altitude as the lead airplane. The chief pilot described the trail position as three airplane lengths (about 78 ft) aft and left of the lead airplane and slightly lower than the lead airplane. Even though none of the pilots stated that the trail airplane should be flown higher than the lead airplane, a video taken of the flight showed that the trail airplane pilot flew the trail airplane higher than the lead airplane until impact. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not provide any guidance to pilots on how to fly skydiving formation flights nor does it require skydiving operators to provide skydiving pilot training or skydiving formation pilot training. The skydiving operator did not provide its pilots skydiving formation flight training, and it did not keep records of pilot training nor was it required to do so by the FAA. The United States Parachute Association published an article titled, "Formation Flying 101: A Guide for Jump Pilots" that provided guidelines for skydiving formation flights, including, in part, that the trail airplane should be within 100 ft of the lead airplane; however, it did not specify that the trail airplane should be lower than the lead airplane. The article did state that altitude separation is the No. 1 way to avoid a collision and that the trail airplane pilot has only one thing to do–hold position relative to the lead aircraft and never lose sight of it. It is essential that pilots flying skydiving operation formation flights have adequate training to conduct the flights properly and ensure the safety of their passengers. If both pilots had received adequate skydiving formation flight training, they might have had a consensus about how the formation flight should have been flown. If the trail airplane pilot had received such training, he might have been more vigilant about maintaining adequate lateral and vertical separation from the lead airplane during the flight.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Cessna 182L from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Midair collision during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot of other aircraft
  • factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Training › Type/qual of instruct/training › Pilot of other aircraft
  • factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Training › Type/qual of instruct/training › Pilot
  • factor Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training › Upgrade training › FAA/Regulator

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 428 hours in all; 65 in this make and model; 75 in the last 90 days; 14 in the last 30 days; 315 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,960 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 8, 2013
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,348 lb
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental Motors O-470-R (piston); 4,960 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: SUW Superior WI at 10:20 pm
  • Destination: SUW Superior WI
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 39°F (4°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.05 inHg
  • Observation at 10:55 pm from SUW

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers4

The factual record for the Cessna 185F from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Midair collision during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Training › Type/qual of instruct/training › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Training › Type/qual of instruct/training › Pilot of other aircraft
  • factor Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training › Upgrade training › FAA/Regulator

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 535 hours in all; 72 in this make and model; 130 in the last 90 days; 30 in the last 30 days; 430 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,198 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 25, 2013
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental Motors IO-520 Series (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: SUW Superior WI
  • Destination: SUW Superior WI
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 32, 4,001 ft by 75 ft

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers5

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN14LA036.