Piaggio P180 accident near Boyne City, Michigan, October 31, 2012
On October 31, 2012 at about 1:30 pm local time, a Piaggio P180, registered N401WS, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Boyne City, Michigan (Boyne City Municipal Airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The select/bypass valve's failure to seal correctly because of improper shimming, which resulted in an uncommanded and uncontrollable left turn during landing. Contributing to the accident was the overhaul facility's improper overhaul of the steering manifold.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 31, 2012 · about 1:30 pm local time
- Place
- Boyne City, Michigan · Boyne City Municipal Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Piaggio P180 Avanti · all P180s on the register
- Registration
- N401WS · no longer on the register · serial 1057
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot stated that, during landing, the nosewheel steering was not engaged and that, after the airplane touched down, it made an uncommanded left turn. The pilot used landing gear braking and reverse thrust to control the airplane, but it still continued to veer left and then off the runway. The airplane struck the airport perimeter fence and a tree and came to rest. Postaccident examinations and tests of the nosewheel steering system and its associated components revealed that the steering actuator did move uncommanded at varying rates and directions when electrical power was off and hydraulics were engaged to the nosewheel steering system. Further, this occurred as a result of the select/bypass valve's failure to seal properly when in an unpowered state due to incorrect shimming within the select/bypass valve, which allowed hydraulic fluid to enter the servo valve when the system was off. The available hydraulic pressure was then ported to move the steering actuator relative to the position of the servo valve spool. Examinations also confirmed that, when the servo valve was electrically powered off, the spool could slightly free-float, and the unpowered spool position could be biased in the direction of the last commanded travel from when the system was last engaged. Examination of the rest of the airplane revealed no other mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The nose landing gear assembly was overhauled 7 days before the accident. However, the postaccident examinations revealed that the overhaul was not conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's component maintenance manual and did not meet the requirements of Service Bulletin 80-0249, which was required by Airworthiness Directive (AD ) 2009-21-08 rev 1, even though the maintenance records indicated that the AD was completed and signed off by the operator for the accident airplane.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control on ground during landing (landing roll)
- Runway excursion during landing (landing roll)
- Flight control sys malf/fail during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Landing gear actuator › Failure
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Landing gear actuator › Not serviced/maintained
- Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Total experience w/ equipment › Maintenance personnel
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › (general) › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 11,506 hours in all; 685 in this make and model; 85 in the last 90 days; 19 in the last 30 days; 8,656 as pilot in command; 3,710 on instruments
- Last flight review: May 23, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 645 hours in all; 109 in this make and model; 33 in the last 90 days; 14 in the last 30 days; 523 as pilot in command; 73 on instruments
- Last flight review: April 7, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,002 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, October 10, 2012; 2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 12,100 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Pratt And Whitney PT6-66 (turboprop); 3,002 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt And Whitney PT6-66 (turboprop); 3,002 hours total
- Operator: Flagship Private Air, LLC
The flight
- Departed from: KYIP Detroit MI at 12:22 pm
- Destination: N98 Boyne City MI
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 27, 4,001 ft by 75 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 360° at 16 knots, gusting 25
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 1,600 ft; ovct at 1,600 ft
- Temperature: 41°F (5°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
- Altimeter: 29.68 inHg
- Observation at 1:05 pm from KCVX, 13 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.