Cessna 560XL incident near Birmingham, Alabama, December 13, 2010
On December 13, 2010 at about 1:57 pm local time, a Cessna 560XL, registered N498AB, was involved in an incident during landing near Birmingham, Alabama (Birmingham-Shuttlesworth Iap airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The manufacturer's inadequate initial design and inadequate subsequent modifications of the tailcone, which allowed moisture to collect and freeze around rudder cables during operations in subfreezing temperatures, resulting in a loss of rudder authority during landing.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 13, 2010 · about 1:57 pm local time
- Place
- Birmingham, Alabama · Birmingham-Shuttlesworth Iap · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 560XL · all 560XLs on the register
- Registration
- N498AB · no longer on the register · serial 560-5116
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During approach and landing, the pilots noted that the airplane had stiff rudder operation. A postflight examination of the airplane found ice in its tailcone stinger, through which the rudder and elevator control cables run. Further investigation discovered that other Cessna 560XL airplanes had encountered the same problem. The design of the airplane was such that water could enter the tailcone, collect there, and freeze around the rudder cables during operations in subfreezing temperatures. The manufacturer had issued a service letter (SL) in 2005 to add a drain hole in the tailcone stinger for in-service airplanes and added a drain hole to production airplanes; this incident airplane had a drain hole in its tailcone that was consistent with the SL. Therefore, the drain hole specified in the SL was not sufficient to correct the problem. In addition, the investigation discovered that some production airplanes had drain holes that were smaller than the size specified in the SL. The manufacturer subsequently issued an alert service letter (ASL) in January 2011 to inspect the existing drain holes to ensure they were the right size, seal an existing drain hole, and add another drain hole in the aft canted bulkhead; however, in March 2011, an airplane modified in accordance with the ASL experienced stuck rudder controls; ice and water were found in its tailcone stinger. The manufacturer subsequently issued a mandatory service bulletin (SB) in October 2011 that specified additional modifications intended to reduce the amount of moisture that can enter the tailcone stinger and to improve the drainage. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) district office that oversees the production certification of the Cessna 560XL and the manufacturer's issuance of associated SLs and SBs did not detect the improper-sized holes on some production airplanes. The manufacturer subsequently implemented a specific inspection to verify the drain hole installation on production airplanes, and the FAA has followed up.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Flight control sys malf/fail during landing defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure › Rudder misc structure › Design
- Organizational issues › Development › Selection/certification/testin › Equip certification/testing › FAA/Regulator
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Rain › Contributed to outcome
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 16,282 hours in all; 3,767 in this make and model; 13,310 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: April 1, 2010
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,397 hours in all; 5,252 in this make and model; 5,514 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: April 1, 2010
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,994 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, October 28, 2010
- Maximum gross weight: 20,000 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: P&W Canada PW545A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: P&W Canada PW545A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Executive Jet Management INC
The flight
- Departed from: TEB Teterboro NJ at 10:42 am
- Destination: BHM Birmingham AL
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 290° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 6 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 2,800 ft
- Temperature: 19°F (-7°C), dew point 10°F (-12°C)
- Altimeter: 30.06 inHg
- Observation at 12:53 pm from BHM
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
