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Accidents · NTSB ANC16LA010 · Final report

Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II accident near Valdez, Alaska, December 16, 2015

On December 16, 2015 at about 6:42 pm local time, a 2014 Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II, registered N255VS, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Valdez, Alaska (Valdez Pioneer Field). It was an aerial observation flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The overhaul facility’s improper and excessive use of an approved lubricant during overhaul of the fuel injection servo, which resulted in a disruption of fuel flow and a total loss of engine power.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 16, 2015 · about 6:42 pm local time
Place
Valdez, Alaska · Valdez Pioneer Field · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II, built 2014
Registration
N255VS · registry record · serial 13685
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Aerial observation flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot was departing on a power line patrol flight in the helicopter. After liftoff, the pilot hovered the helicopter about 10 ft above ground level (agl) before commencing a left turn, accelerating to about 25 knots, and initiating a climb. As the helicopter climbed through about 20 ft agl, the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot performed an autorotation, but the helicopter landed hard, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage, skids and tail boom. Review of the accident helicopter's maintenance records revealed that the fuel injection servo had been repaired and reinstalled about 2 hours before the accident flight. During postaccident examination of the fuel injection servo assembly, small amounts of a white, greasy substance were discovered in the servo assembly. The greasy substance, later identified as DuPont Krytox, is a lubricant used in small amounts and specific locations, during reassembly after overhaul or maintenance of the fuel injection servo assembly. Inspection of a fuel injection servo from a different helicopter that had been overhauled by the same maintenance facility revealed similar contamination. A representative from the maintenance facility stated that about 6 months before the accident, they had begun using Dupont Krytox, an approved lubricant, but did not realize that it was being used in excess and in locations not approved per the maintenance/service manual. Due to the improper and excessive use of assembly lubricant and the lack of engine anomalies, it is likely that the lubricant contaminated the fuel injection servo, causing a disruption in fuel flow, which resulted in a total loss of engine power.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb defining event
  2. Autorotation Hard landing

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel distribution › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Repair › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 1,468 hours in all; 1,020 in this make and model; 70 in the last 90 days; 15 in the last 30 days; 1,394 as pilot in command; 320 on instruments
  • Last flight review: May 29, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 766.2 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 11, 2015
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-540-AE1A5 (piston); 766 hours total
  • Operator: Vertical Solutions LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: VDZ Valdez AK
  • Destination: VDZ Valdez AK
  • Flight plan: VFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 7,000 ft
  • Temperature: 21°F (-6°C), dew point 21°F (-6°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 9:36 am from PAVD

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ANC16LA010.