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Accidents · NTSB WPR16FA041 · Final report

Piper PA 32RT-300T accident near Bakersfield, California, December 19, 2015

On December 19, 2015 at about 11:56 pm local time, a 1978 Piper PA 32RT-300T, registered N36402, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Bakersfield, California. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 5 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The noninstrument-rated pilot's decision to conduct and continue the flight despite forecast and en route instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), which were not conducive to safe operation under visual flight rules. Also causal to the accident was the pilot's decision to accept an instrument flight rules clearance and fly into IMC during cruise flight, which led to his spatial disorientation and a resultant loss of control and an in-flight breakup. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's self-induced pressure to arrive at the destination for a party that night.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 19, 2015 · about 11:56 pm local time
Place
Bakersfield, California · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
5 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA 32RT-300T, built 1978 · all PA 32RT-300Ts on the register
Registration
N36402 · no longer on the register · serial 32R-7887041
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot downloaded official weather briefings onto his tablet computer the night before and again on the morning of the planned cross-country personal flight. The forecast conditions were not conducive to visual flight and included a series of storms passing through the intended flight route, which resulted in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), high cloud tops, and the potential for icing and mountain obscuration. Despite these forecasts, the low-time, noninstrument-rated private pilot departed with his wife and their three children for the intended vacation, which included a surprise party later that night. According to Federal Aviation Administration radar tracking data, shortly after departure, the flight began to encounter the forecast weather conditions, and the flightpath and altitude began to change as the pilot repeatedly deviated to avoid clouds. Air traffic control (ATC) personnel provided the pilot with regular reports of bands of precipitation and the potential for airframe icing along the intended direction of flight. However, the pilot chose to continue the flight, and the cloud tops ahead continued to rise. The pilot kept climbing the airplane to remain clear of the cloud tops and eventually reached an altitude close to Class A airspace, where an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance would be required, and close to the airplane's approved operating ceiling of 20,000 ft. The flight continued, but the airplane then began descending, and shortly after, the airplane likely entered the clouds. An air traffic controller then offered the pilot the option to obtain an IFR clearance and continue the flight. Despite his lack of both an instrument rating and his limited experience flying in IMC, the pilot accepted. Radar data indicated that, during this period, the airplane turned abruptly left, directly toward a region of heavy precipitation. Then, shortly after accepting the IFR clearance, and likely while the pilot was distracted from controlling the airplane as he configured the airplane's avionics, the flightpath became erratic. The airplane performed a rapid descending left turn, after which the pilot transmitted a distress call. The flight continued to progress erratically, and the pilot made another distress call, after which the controller provided the pilot vectors to a nearby airport; however, no response was received. Subsequently, an alert notice was issued for the airplane, and the wreckage was located a few hours later. Analysis of the debris field, airplane component damage patterns, and fracture surfaces indicated that both wings and stabilator halves separated from the fuselage in flight due to overstress resulting from excessive air loads. These air loads were likely induced by the pilot during his attempt to regain airplane control, which he lost shortly after the airplane entered the clouds. All persons on board were ejected from the airplane during the breakup sequence and sustained fatal injuries. The reasons for the loss of control were likely the pilot's inability to maintain airplane control in IMC; his spatial disorientation, as evidenced by the erratic flightpath; airframe icing; pitot-static system icing; or some combination thereof. Icing could not be ruled out because the airplane was in visible moisture and flew directly into and toward precipitation just before the diversion. Although the airplane was equipped with an autopilot, variations in heading and altitude throughout major portions of the flight suggested that the pilot was likely hand-flying the airplane. According to one of the airplane's owners, the autopilot was operational. However, the primary autopilot components were destroyed during the accident; thus, its operational status could not be determined. The pilot had planned for the flight to last just over 2 hours and, based on his departure time, would have landed just before sunset. However, because of the weather deviations, the airplane had only reached the half-way point when the accident occurred, with about 30 minutes remaining before sunset. The airplane was only equipped with a supplemental oxygen system sufficient for three persons. However, for more than half of the flight duration, the airplane was operating at altitudes that required all five occupants to be provided with and using oxygen. An oxygen mask was found entangled with the pilot's jacket, and the relative clarity of his communications with air traffic control suggested that he was using supplemental oxygen. Given the pilot was not rated for IFR and did not have adequate oxygen equipment for his family, he may have been reluctant to declare an emergency and request a climb above flight level 180 and into class A airspace, which would likely have taken him into visual meteorological conditions, but instead accepted the IFR clearance at a lower level that did not ensure he could remain clear of clouds. His decision-making under increasingly adverse conditions was likely driven by a desire to get his family to the destination for the scheduled event that evening. Although the pilot's autopsy identified significant coronary artery disease, there was no evidence of an old or new heart attack. Further, the pilot's radio communications and subsequent distress call revealed no evidence to support pilot impairment or incapacitation due to the coronary disease.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. VFR encounter with IMC during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Loss of control in flight during enroute (cruise)
  3. Attempted remediation/recovery during uncontrolled descent
  4. Aircraft structural failure during uncontrolled descent
  5. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Qualification/certification › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Spatial disorientation › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › (general) › (general) › Capability exceeded
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Clouds › Effect on personnel
  • factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Personality/attitude › Motivation/respond to pressure › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 269.5 hours in all; 56.5 in this make and model; 22.5 in the last 90 days; 6.4 in the last 30 days; 222 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: July 12, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,840.4 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, April 18, 2015; 1,111 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming TIO-540-S1AD (piston); 3,840 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: RHV San Jose CA at 10:35 pm
  • Destination: HND Henderson NV
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 170° at 3 knots
  • Visibility: 4 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 5,000 ft
  • Temperature: 48°F (9°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 11:54 pm from KBFL, 10 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers4

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

22 documents, released by the NTSB on May 8, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Other NTSB records under N36402 the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2010-07-10WPR10CA342 · accident near Sedona, AZ · substantial damage · no injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.