Amateur-built M24 ORION PLUS accident near Cape Girardeau, Missouri, May 22, 2022
On May 22, 2022 at about 1:03 pm local time, a 2022 amateur-built M24 ORION PLUS (gyroplane), registered N590DM, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern downwind) near Cape Girardeau, Missouri (Cape Girardeau Regional Airpor airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s failure to maintain controlled flight, which resulted in a hard left roll, excessive blade flapping and a subsequent in-flight separation of the right horizontal stabilizer.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 22, 2022 · about 1:03 pm local time
- Place
- Cape Girardeau, Missouri · Cape Girardeau Regional Airpor · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Amateur-built M24 ORION PLUS, built 2022
- Registration
- N590DM · registry record · serial 24213475
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was ferrying a gyroplane from Gulf Shores, Alabama, to his home in South Dakota. He made an overnight stopover in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, as part of his planned route of flight. The following morning he requested progressive taxi instructions from air traffic control to the assigned departure runway. After he taxied to the runway he departed to the northwest, consistent with what he told the controller. However, shortly into his climb, he reported to the controller that he wanted to return to the airport and the controller cleared him to land on his departure runway. The gyroplane flew the airport traffic pattern back to the runway to land; however, during the downwind leg the gyroplane rapidly descended to the ground following a loud crack that was heard by a witness at the airport. Postaccident examination of the gyroplane revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that could have precluded normal operation. Data retrieved from an onboard recording system suggests that the engine performance was unremarkable and consistent with the throttle movements throughout the final moments of the flight. Paint transfer marks on the rotor blades suggested that the main rotor contacted the horizontal stabilizer right winglet in the final moments of the accident flight, which was likely the source of the “crack” sound heard by the witness. The postaccident examination revealed evidence of severe blade flapping from a partial bend of the teetering stop of one of the main rotor blades and rotor contact with the horizontal stabilizer, which is typically due to a several-second low g or zero rotor load condition that slows the autorotation speed of the rotor. This condition was likely the result of the 270° hard left roll before the gyroplane rapidly descended and impacted the ground. Without the ability to maintain a load on the rotor in the full roll over, the rotor would have slowed and began severe flapping. The investigation was unable to determine the reason for such a severe control input (hard left roll) based on the available evidence. The evidence does indicate distress in the pilot’s voice and that he had opened his door at some point during the flight. There was no damage to the door latches and the door was found at the same distance from the main wreckage as the right horizontal stabilizer (about 170 ft). As a door annunciation would have informed the pilot if the door was not properly latched on takeoff, it is likely that this occurred in flight, and was possibly intentional if the pilot anticipated a hard landing. The accident was the result of the pilot’s failure to maintain controlled flight, which resulted in a hard left roll, excessive blade flapping, and a subsequent inflight separation of the right horizontal stabilizer.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Part(s) separation from AC during approach (VFR pattern downwind)
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR pattern downwind) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure › Horizontal stabilizer › Capability exceeded
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea
- Flight time: 350 hours in all; 20 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: BasicMed (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 40 hours
- Last inspection: condition inspection, February 25, 2022; 40 hours since
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rotax 915 IS2a (piston); 40 hours total
The flight
- Destination: Sioux Falls SD
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 02, 3,997 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 350° at 8 knots, gusting 16
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 2,900 ft; a few clouds at 1,200 ft
- Temperature: 59°F (15°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
- Altimeter: 30.24 inHg
- Observation at 7:53 am from KCGI, 1 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KCGI 221253Z 35008G16KT 10SM FEW012 OVC029 15/13 A3024 RMK AO2 SLP237 T01500128
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
22 documents, released by the NTSB on April 10, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Accident Phootgraphs | PDF, 2 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 2 | Cockpit Display - Specialist's Factual REPORT_WPR22FA184 | PDF, 11 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 3 | Attachment 1 to Cockpit Display - Specialist's Factual Report_tabular Data | data file · our copy | Download |
| 4 | Attachment 2 to Cockpit Display - Specialist's Factual Report_alert Data | data file · our copy | Download |
| 5 | Engine Control Unit Data - Specialist's Factual REPORT_WPR22FA184 | PDF, 8 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 6 | Attachment 1 to Engine Control Unit Data - Specialist's Factual Report_tabular Data | data file · our copy | Download |
| 7 | Interview Transcript, Paul Salmon | PDF, 10 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 8 | Interview Transcript, Mark Sprigg | PDF, 15 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 9 | Email Correspondence Mark Sprigg | PDF, 3 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 10 | Interview Transcript Gregory | PDF, 18 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 11 | Pilot Logbook Excerpt | PDF, 8 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 12 | Engine Logbook | PDF, 4 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 13 | Aircraft Logbook | PDF, 6 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 14 | Text Exchange with Builder | PDF, 2 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 15 | NTSB Onscene Report | PDF, 9 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 16 | NTSB Wreckage Examination Report | PDF, 9 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 17 | Email Correspondence with Technical Expert | PDF, 4 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 18 | Pilot Toxicology Report | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 19 | Memorandum of Record, Pilot Autopsy | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 20 | Materials Laboratory Factual Report 23-033 | PDF, 8 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 21 | Foreign Notification to Ansv | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 22 | Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 | PDF, 2 pages · our copy | View Download |
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
