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Accidents · NTSB ERA25FA151 · Final report

Cirrus Design CORP SR22 accident near Lafayette, Georgia, March 20, 2025

On March 20, 2025 at about 6:30 pm local time, a 2006 Cirrus Design CORP SR22, registered N969SS, was destroyed in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Lafayette, Georgia (Barwick Lafayette airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack while landing and the flight instructor’s inadequate remedial action, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin at an altitude too low for recovery.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 20, 2025 · about 6:30 pm local time
Place
Lafayette, Georgia · Barwick Lafayette · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cirrus Design CORP SR22, built 2006
Registration
N969SS · registry record · serial 2157
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The reported purpose of the flight was because the pilot receiving instruction and his flight instructor both had a free day to go flying. The flight logbook of the pilot receiving instruction showed that he had been receiving instruction toward his commercial pilot certificate from the flight instructor. After picking up the flight instructor the pilot took off and completed two circuits in the airport traffic pattern. Both landing approaches during these circuits were consistent with a power-off 180° accuracy approach and landing. The third circuit was consistent with the previous two approaches. During the third approach, as the airplane neared the ground, data recovered from avionics onboard the airplane showed that the airplane’s pitch began to increase while the airplane was in a steep left bank. Simultaneously, the airspeed began to decrease below the stall speed listed in the airplane Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH). The airplane then suddenly rolled right, and the pitch decreased. The airplane impacted the ground before the runway threshold in the displaced threshold area and was heavily damaged by postimpact fire. Postaccident examination of the wreckage found no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The power-off 180° accuracy approach and landing was a maneuver that was required to be demonstrated in order to obtain a commercial pilot certificate. This maneuver involved reducing engine power to idle while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern and attempting to land on or just beyond a preselected point on the runway. Performance of this maneuver required the pilot to assess the risks associated with wind, airplane performance, and low-altitude maneuvering, to include stalls or spins. One of the common errors associated with this maneuver was a pilot’s attempt to “stretch” a glide during an undershot approach. Given the airplane’s observed pitch, bank, and airspeed during the final moments of the accident flight, it is likely that, during the power-off 180° accuracy approach and landing maneuver attempt, the pilot receiving instruction misjudged the landing, which resulted in an undershot approach. He then likely attempted to stretch the glide, which resulted in the airplane exceeding the critical angle of attack and entering an aerodynamic stall/spin at an altitude too low to successfully recover. Additionally, the flight instructor should have been able to recognize the airplane’s attitude and airspeed as the airplane approached the low altitude aerodynamic stall and been able to intervene in sufficient time to prevent it. Although there was no clear evidence that the pilot receiving instruction was impaired by effects of diabetes or its treatment at the time of the accident, the pilot receiving instruction had also used prescription medications, including clomiphene and chloroquine, that were not reported at his last aviation medical examination, and that, while not typically impairing, could have had adverse side effects. In addition, the pilot receiving instruction had cardiovascular conditions, including moderate coronary artery disease, high blood pressure, and diabetes, that were associated with increased risk of an impairing or incapacitating cardiovascular event, such as arrythmia, heart attack, or stroke. Although there is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred, such an event cannot be excluded by autopsy evidence alone. The flight instructor’s abnormally elevated carboxyhemoglobin level can be attributed to effects of the postimpact fire. In-flight carbon monoxide poisoning was unlikely given the fact that the pilot receiving instruction did not have elevated carboxyhemoglobin.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aerodynamic stall/spin during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Not attained/maintained
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Instructor/check pilot

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,645 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 379.3 hours in all; 310.6 in this make and model; 16.5 in the last 90 days; 8.5 in the last 30 days; 333.4 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: June 9, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,054.5 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, October 1, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,400 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental Aerospace Technolo IO-550-N (piston); 2,654 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 20, 4,999 ft by 75 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 330° at 10 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 4,300 ft
  • Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 30°F (-1°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.97 inHg
  • Observation at 2:35 pm from 9A5

Weather report (METAR): K9A5 201835Z AUTO 33010KT 10SM SCT043 08/M01 A2997 RMK AO2 T00761011

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

22 documents, released by the NTSB on January 14, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Witness Statements PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
2 Memorandum for Record A�� Purpose of Flight PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
3 Rmg Fuel Receipt and Fueler Statement PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
4 9A5 Airport Fuel Farm Report PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
5 Pilot Logbook PDF, 29 pages · our copy View Download
6 Flight Instructor Logbook Excerpt PDF, 37 pages · our copy View Download
7 Memorandum for Record A�� Flight Instructor Former Employer Information PDF, 6 pages · our copy View Download
8 Cirrus SR22 Pilot's Operating Handbook Excerpts PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
9 Maintenance Records PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
10 Meteorology Factual Report PDF, 22 pages · our copy View Download
11 ADS-B Flight Track map file · our copy Download
12 Wreckage Examination Summary PDF, 29 pages · our copy View Download
13 Memorandum for Record A�� Engine Rpm Calculation Using Propeller Strike Marks PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
14 Memorandum for Record A�� Flap Setting PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
15 Video - Postaccident Fire Caps Bprs Deployment video · our copy View Download
16 Toxicological Reports PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
17 Multiple Electronic Devices - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 17 pages · our copy View Download
18 Attachment 1 to Multiple Electronic Devices - Specialist's Factual Report data file · our copy Download
19 Attachment 2 to Multiple Electronic Devices - Specialist's Factual Report data file · our copy Download
20 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 15 pages · our copy View Download
21 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
22 Evidence Control Forms PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA25FA151.