Piper PA32 accident near Haines City, Florida, August 12, 2023

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported the purpose of the flight was to perform a local post-maintenance test flight. The pilot reported that during his preflight inspection, he manually checked all four fuel tanks and reported that he had sufficient fuel for the flight. The pilot reported that the taxi, engine runup, takeoff, and the initial climb were normal. The pilot reported that after beginning an en route climb, the engine power dropped to 1,200 rpm. The pilot attempted to restart the engine multiple times; however, engine power did not return and the pilot performed a forced landing. During the landing the airplane struck trees, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and the fuselage. Postaccident examination revealed that the air intake tube attached to the fuel servo inlet had a large hole in the tube, which would allow unfiltered air to enter the throttle body and the engine’s induction system. The fuel servo air inlet displayed signs of contamination; however, testing revealed that while there was contamination in the fuel servo’s air side metering chamber, the fuel servo was capable of normal operation on the test equipment. The examination of the rest of the airframe and the engine did not reveal any other anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Data recovered from onboard avionics revealed that just before the loss of engine power, the fuel pressure and the fuel flow decreased to about 2 psi and 0.3 gallons per hour (gph) respectively. At the same time, all the engine’s exhaust gas temperatures (EGT) increased about 200°F before dropping to levels that were consistent with combustion no longer occurring within the engine cylinders. These indications were consistent with the engine being starved of fuel. The data further revealed that both auxiliary fuel tanks and the left main fuel tank had sufficient fuel; however, the right fuel quantity indicator was malfunctioning and reported 0 gallons. The pilot reported he knew that the right main fuel quantity was malfunctioning, which is why he always manually checked the fuel tanks before flight. Due to the malfunctioning right main fuel quantity indicator, and the right main fuel tank’s breach during the accident sequence, the amount of fuel in the right main fuel tank at the time of the loss of engine power could not be determined. The pilot reported that after the loss of engine power, he switched tanks twice in an attempt to restart the engine. Despite the pilot switching to a fuel tank that was reporting sufficient fuel, and turning on the airframe’s electrically driven fuel pump, the fuel pressure and fuel flow never returned to a level that would support engine operation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.