Boeing 737-890 accident near Santa Ana, California, August 21, 2023
On August 21, 2023 at about 6:15 am local time, a 2008 Boeing 737-890, registered N516AS, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing near Santa Ana, California (John Wayne/Orange County Airpo airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 112 people were on board or involved. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during machining, which imparted heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue cracking that caused the pin to fracture during landing.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 21, 2023 · about 6:15 am local time
- Place
- Santa Ana, California · John Wayne/Orange County Airpo · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 112 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 737-890, built 2008 · all 737-890s on the register
- Registration
- N516AS · registry record · serial 39044
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
This accident occurred when the left main landing gear (MLG) of an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-800 collapsed during landing. Postaccident examination revealed that the aft trunnion pin in the left MLG failed during landing due to a fatigue fracture. The fracture initiated from a small intergranular region below the external chromium electroplated layer. The fatigue crack, which had propagated to a depth of 0.144 inches, was large enough to cause the remaining material to fracture in tensile or upward-bending overstress during landing, resulting in the collapse of the left MLG. Further examination of the aft trunnion pin revealed that the intergranular region where the fatigue crack initiated was located along an area with a darker visual contrast following temper etch and metallographic inspections. This region also showed an elevated reading from a Barkhausen noise inspection. The elevated readings and area of visual contrast were consistent with the area being exposed to higher temperatures becoming softer than the surrounding material. The heat exposure most likely occurred as part of the excessive grinding of the surface, performed during the maintenance overhaul of the pin that occurred on July 5, 2018, as part of the overhaul of the left MLG assembly. This area was subject to grinding to first remove the original chromium layer, and then a second grinding after the new chromium layer was applied to bring the trunnion pin into specified dimensions. The over-tempered region and the surrounding material created an area of intergranular fracture within the material in the area where grinding had occurred. The investigation considered whether the formation of this area could have occurred during the baking and stress relief processes following aggressive grinding during the chromium removal step of the overhaul. However, after removing the chromium electroplating layer, the temper etch inspections did not detect any grinding burns. Because a temper etch inspection cannot be used after the chromium electroplating layer was reapplied, the grinding burn likely occurred during machining after the new chromium layer electroplating process. At the time of the left MLG assembly overhaul, the landing gear assembly had accumulated 11,116 landing cycles. The overhauled left MLG assembly was installed on the accident airplane on July 17, 2018. Afterward, the left MLG, including the trunnion pin, accumulated an additional 4,710 landing cycles. A fatigue crack analysis performed on the aft trunnion pin fracture surface showed that the fatigue crack had been present for at least 797 landing cycles. Therefore, the crack was not present when the pin was overhauled in July 2018 but had likely developed later as a result of the grinding performed during the overhaul. Because most of the nondestructive inspection techniques used to detect damage to plated trunnion pins typically rely on identifying cracks, techniques such as magnetic particle inspection and fluorescent penetrant inspection would have been ineffective before crack initiation. However, results of this examination and previous NTSB investigations demonstrate that even relatively mild heat exposure from grinding and/or machining during overhaul can lead to cracking, which can lead to fatigue crack growth and failed landing gear components, as occurred in this accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Landing gear collapse during landing
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during landing defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear attach sec › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear attach sec › Incorrect service/maintenance
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
- Flight time: 20,403 hours in all; 10,837 in this make and model; 77 in the last 90 days; 47 in the last 30 days; 10,858 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
- Flight time: 10,705 hours in all; 483 in this make and model; 254 in the last 90 days; 63 in the last 30 days; 1,200 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 53,207.3 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme
- Maximum gross weight: 174,700 lb
- Seats: 149
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 3: Cfm Intl CFM56-7B27 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 4: Cfm Intl CFM56-7B27 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Alaska Airlines
The flight
- Departed from: SEA Seattle WA at 3:36 am
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 20R, 5,700 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: at 3 knots
- Visibility: 2 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 1,100 ft; a few clouds at 1,100 ft
- Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
- Altimeter: 29.81 inHg
- Observation at 11:05 am from ksna
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 6 | |||
| Passengers | 106 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
16 documents, released by the NTSB on May 22, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N516AS the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
