Bell 206 accident near St Thomas, CB, February 15, 2021
On February 15, 2021 at about 7:14 pm local time, a Bell 206 (helicopter), registered N13AT, was destroyed in an accident during maneuvering (low-alt flying) near St Thomas, CB. It was an aerial observation flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A total loss of engine power due to fatigue failure of two of the stage 3 compressor blades. Contributing to the failure of the compressor blades was the failure of maintenance personnel to inspect the compressor at the recommended interval for operation in corrosive environments.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 15, 2021 · about 7:14 pm local time
- Place
- St Thomas, CB · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bell 206 B · all 206s on the register
- Registration
- N13AT · no longer on the register · serial 3267
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Aerial observation flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During a short sightseeing flight around an island, the helicopter lost total engine power and descended into heavily wooded, steep terrain. The majority of the helicopter was consumed by a postcrash fire. The helicopter’s proximity to the rising terrain at the time of the power loss likely precluded the pilot from performing a successful autorotation. Examination of the engine found evidence of fatigue fractures on two of the stage 3 compressor blades and fatigue fractures on the majority of the stage 6 compressor blades. Analysis of the remainder of the stages 3 and 6 compressor wheels showed that they met material requirements. Thermal damage to the compressor case halves precluded determining whether the stages 3 and 6 blades were rubbing against the case and its plastic coating, which could have initiated the fatigue fractures. While pitting corrosion could also result in fatigue fractures, no evidence of pitting corrosion was found and only surface corrosion was present. The liberation of the two stage 3 compressor blades led to their ingestion within the remaining compressor stages, resulting in the total loss of engine power in flight. The engine maintenance manual contained provisions for more frequent inspections when the engine is operating in an erosive and/or corrosive environment, such as where the accident operator was located. A caution within the 300-hour inspection table stated that the inspection must not exceed 300 hours or 12 months for coated compressor wheels, including the accident engine’s stage 2-3 compressor wheel. The engine logbook showed that a 300-hour engine inspection was completed about 3 years and 800 flight hours before the accident. Paperwork associated with the two most recent inspections, conducted by the accident operator about 11 months and 1 month before the accident, respectively, did not indicate that the 300-hour inspection had been performed. Had maintenance personnel completed the 300-hour inspection of the compressor case halves, blades, and vanes within the recommended 12-month interval, the presence of corrosion or damage to the plastic coating could have been detected and addressed.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
- Loss of engine power (total) during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Compressor section › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: instrument: helicopter
- Flight time: 9,800 hours in all; 9,999 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 11,504.2 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, January 25, 2021; 15 hours since
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Allison 250-C20 SER (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Caribbean Buzz Management LLC.
The flight
- Departed from: STT St. Thomas, Usvi OF at 7:10 pm
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 080° at 12 knots
- Visibility: 8 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 5,500 ft
- Temperature: 85°F (29°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
- Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
- Observation at 2:53 pm from TIST, 4 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
14 documents, released by the NTSB on January 12, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Airworthiness Group Factual Report | PDF, 13 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Airworthiness Group Factual Report - Attachment 1 | PDF, 112 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Airworthiness Group Factual Report - Attachment 2 | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Airworthiness Group Factual Report - Attachment 3 | PDF, 10 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Airworthiness Group Factual Report - Attachment 4 | PDF, 10 pages | View Download |
| 6 | N13AT Witness Video | MOV file | Download |
| 7 | Witness Statement | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 8 | Investigative Photos | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Toxicological Report | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 10 | Memorandum for Record A�� Autopsy / Toxicological Reports | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 11 | Evidence Control Form | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 12 | Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 13 | Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 14 | Video Study | PDF, 8 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N13AT the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
