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Accidents · NTSB ERA19FA201 · Final report

Beech E55 accident near Hope Mills, North Carolina, June 27, 2019

On June 27, 2019 at about 2:33 am local time, a 1979 Beech E55, registered N664AR, was destroyed in an accident during approach (VFR pattern base) near Hope Mills, North Carolina (Fayetteville Regional Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to disengage an uncommanded nose-down pitch input. Contributing to the accident was improper maintenance of the pitch trim servo, which would have precluded a physical override of the pitch servo.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 27, 2019 · about 2:33 am local time · cases in 2019
Place
Hope Mills, North Carolina · Fayetteville Regional Airport · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech E55 UNDESIGNAT, built 1979 · all E55s on the register
Registration
N664AR · no longer on the register · serial TE-1163
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Three days before the accident flight, the accident pilot flew two friends/pilots on a cross-country flight in the accident airplane. According to one of the friends, during the first leg of that trip, the attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) fail amber caution light illuminated in the cockpit at engine startup and remained illuminated for 12 to 15 minutes, which included the initial portion of the flight. They discussed continuing the flight under visual flight rules because the autopilot would not engage with the caution light illuminated and would not remain engaged if the caution light illuminated. During the time the caution light was illuminated, no anomalies were observed with the electronic flight information system (EFIS) display. The caution light extinguished, and the accident pilot engaged the autopilot for the remainder of the flight leg. During the return flight, the light remained extinguished and the accident pilot used the autopilot; however, after landing, he turned off the avionics and then back on, and the light illuminated for 3 minutes before he shut down the airplane. He planned to take the airplane to an avionics maintenance facility and also commented that he planned to perform three night landings to maintain his night currency. On the evening of the accident flight, the accident pilot visited the maintenance facility and was informed that the repair related to the AHRS fail light illumination had not been completed because the facility needed to contact the EFIS manufacturer for more information. The accident pilot elected to fly the airplane without the repair having been completed. The accident flight was cleared for takeoff, and about 2 minutes later, the pilot reported a problem to air traffic control but did not specify what the problem was; he stated that he wanted to turn around and land. but the pilot noted that there was an “awful lot of control wheel weight.” The flight was cleared to land, and the pilot subsequently stated, "it's really wanting to pitch down bad for some reason." A witness, who was walking his dog at the time, reported seeing the airplane veer sharply, followed by a steep descent about a 45° angle, just prior to impact. The airplane subsequently impacted a residence and terrain about 2 miles southwest of the approach end of the runway. Examination of the engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions and flight control continuity was confirmed. Examination of the autopilot programming unit and engine monitor revealed that they did not contain any nonvolatile memory. The investigation could not determine if the pilot was troubleshooting or attempting to use the autopilot during the accident flight. Postaccident testing of the clutch tension of the pitch servo revealed the breakaway force needed was 45 lbs. However, the specified required clutch tension breakaway force setting was 13 +/- 2 lbs. This setting was achieved by tightening the castle nut enough to reach the required force. After that, an orange torque seal strip was applied and a cotter pin was installed. Further examination revealed that the cotter pin used to secure the castle nut retaining the clutch appeared to be new, and the castle nut did not align with the factory orange torque strip setting applied at the time of servo completion and final testing. The orange torque strip on the nut and the orange torque strip on the tension washer were about 3/4 of a turn off. At some point during previous maintenance, the castle nut securing the clutch on the servo was overtightened, which caused the breakaway force needed to be 30 lbs over the specified limit. The overtightened clutch would have greatly increased the force required to override the clutch of the pitch servo. The pilot operating handbook for the airplane make/model indicated that an uncommanded pitch could be stopped by: turning off the autopilot master switch; pull the autopilot and trim circuit breakers; turn off the radio master switch; turn off the electrical master switch; push the GA switch on the throttle grip; or push TEST EACH FLT switch on autopilot controller..

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during approach (VFR pattern base)
  2. Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR pattern base) defining event
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Auto flight system › (general) › Not specified other cases naming the flight controls
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Repair › Maintenance personnel
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Auto flight system › Autopilot trim servo › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the flight controls

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 480 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 3
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,178 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, November 1, 2018
  • Maximum gross weight: 5,300 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Continental IO-520 (piston); 987 hours total
  • Engine 2: Continental IO-520 (piston); 517 hours total
  • Operator: Industrial Power Inc

The flight

  • Departed from: FAY Hope Mills NC at 2:29 am
  • Destination: FAY Hope Mills NC
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 04, 7,709 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 200° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 68°F (20°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.18 inHg
  • Observation at 2:53 am from FAY, 3 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Photographs from the investigation 5 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

18 documents, released by the NTSB on December 3, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Interview Summaries PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
2 FAA Interview Summaries PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
3 Fueling Record PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
4 Excerpts from Maintenance Records PDF, 13 pages · our copy View Download
5 Excerpts from Pilot Operating Handbook PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
6 Invoice PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
7 Correspondence from Servo Manufacturer PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
8 Aspen Avionics Mandatory Service Bulletin SB2018-01 PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
9 FAA Ad 2019-01-02 PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
10 Weather Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
11 Photo Array PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
12 FAA Report of Servo Tests and Examinations PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
13 ATC Transcript PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
14 radar Plots PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
15 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
16 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 11 pages · our copy View Download
17 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
18 Evidence Control Forms PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA19FA201.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.

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