Piper PA28 accident near Port Jefferson, New York, February 21, 2016
On February 21, 2016 at about 4:05 am local time, a 1979 Piper PA28, registered N29099, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Port Jefferson, New York. It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 3 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The flight instructor's inadequate preflight fuel planning, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 21, 2016 · about 4:05 am local time
- Place
- Port Jefferson, New York · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed and 3 people had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA28 181, built 1979 · all PA28s on the register
- Registration
- N29099 · no longer on the register · serial 28-7990437
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The student pilot and flight instructor were conducting an instructional cross-country flight with two passengers on board. They were returning to their home airport at night; the flight instructor estimated that there was a headwind of 30-40 knots and the airplane's groundspeed was about 81 knots during the cruise portion of the flight. Just before crossing a large ocean inlet, the flight instructor suggested that they divert for fuel on the other side of the inlet. Shortly thereafter, the engine "sputtered." The flight instructor then turned on the electric fuel pump and instructed the student pilot to switch the fuel selector to the left fuel tank and to maintain 2,000 ft msl. Once the fuel selector had been selected to the left fuel tank, the engine stopped sputtering. The flight instructor informed air traffic control that he wanted to divert to a nearby airport. They continued to fly for another 2-3 minutes when the engine sputtered again and lost total power. The instructor then took control of the airplane from the student pilot and advised the tower controller at the diversion airport that he was declaring an emergency. The flight instructor then made a 180° turn and headed for the shoreline. As the airplane descended, he was unable to see the shoreline due to the darkness and decided to ditch the airplane as close as he could to the beach. Upon touching down, the flight instructor opened the cabin door and instructed everyone to exit the airplane. The student pilot handed the instructor a life vest. The two passengers jumped into the water and started swimming for shore. Neither the student pilot nor the passengers were wearing life vests. About 3 minutes after the ditching, the airplane was located by a helicopter. The flight instructor, student, and one passenger were rescued. A search by the police department and the US Coast Guard could not locate the remaining passenger. About 2 months later, the missing passenger's body was discovered on a beach. The autopsy listed the cause of death as drowning. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact failure or malfunction of the engine or airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the fuel system revealed that the system was essentially devoid of fuel. The flight instructor estimated that 40 gallons of fuel were onboard before departure on the first leg of the flight; the student estimated 36 gallons were onboard. Before they departed from their home airport, the student pilot asked the flight instructor if he wanted to refuel, and the flight instructor advised him that they had plenty of fuel. The student again asked about refueling during the return flight, but the instructor stated the fuel looked good. There was no evidence that the flight instructor had obtained an official weather briefing before the initial or return leg of the flight. On the first leg of the flight, the instructor recognized that the winds aloft increased their groundspeed, allowing them to arrive at their destination sooner, but on the second leg of the flight, those same winds significantly increased their flying time. The instructor should have accounted for the effect of wind on the flight's duration. Review of the POH indicated that, at a 65% power setting, with full fuel tanks (48 gallons usable), endurance would be about 5.3 hours, and at a 65% power setting, with 40 gallons of fuel, endurance would be about 4.4 hours. Examination of aircraft rental and fueling records revealed that the airplane had been operated for 5.1 hours since it was last refueled. Thus it is likely that the flight instructor did not conduct adequate preflight fuel planning; had they done so and had they accounted for the wind, they would have recognized there was insufficient fuel to complete the flight and maintain the required 45 minutes of reserve fuel.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
- Fuel exhaustion during enroute defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Ditching during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weather planning › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Instructor/check pilot
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,800 hours in all; 1,400 in this make and model; 120 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 2,500 as pilot in command; 1,900 on instruments
- Last flight review: July 20, 2015
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: minor injuries
Dual student
- Flight time: 20 hours in all; 19 in this make and model; 10 in the last 90 days; 6 in the last 30 days
- Medical certificate: None
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,174.0 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, January 12, 2016; 83 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,550 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4M (piston); 5,174 hours total
- Operator: Positive Rate Gear Up LLC
The flight
- Departed from: FIT Fitchburg MA at 1:40 am
- Destination: FRG Farmindale NY
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 220° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 45°F (7°C), dew point 37°F (3°C)
- Altimeter: 29.81 inHg
- Observation at 10:56 am from KISP, 10 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
15 documents, released by the NTSB on July 12, 2018. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
