Sikorsky Aircraft CORP S-76 accident near Round Mountain, Texas, September 1, 2025
On September 1, 2025 at about 2:02 am local time, a 2013 Sikorsky Aircraft CORP S-76 (helicopter), registered N36RP, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing near Round Mountain, Texas (Mirasol Hills airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 3 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The flight crew’s failure to properly identify the heliport in dark night conditions, which resulted in the flight crew attempting to land and a subsequent impact with trees and terrain.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 1, 2025 · about 2:02 am local time
- Place
- Round Mountain, Texas · Mirasol Hills · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 3 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Sikorsky Aircraft CORP S-76 D, built 2013 · all S-76s on the register
- Registration
- N36RP · registry record · serial 761037
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The purpose of the on-demand night flight in the helicopter was to transport the passenger from a commercial airport to a private heliport on a ranch in a rural area. Due to previous issues with the helicopter’s autopilot system and the possible concern of losing control in instrument meteorological conditions, the captain decided not to perform an instrument flight rules flight to the heliport. During the flight, an instrument approach was loaded into the helicopter’s flight management system, but it was not activated. Additionally, each pilot had an Apple iPad mounted in the cockpit, that was utilizing ForeFlight with the heliport coordinates loaded into ForeFlight. During the approach to the heliport, the captain contacted the ranch manager via text message on a cellular phone, to ensure the heliport floodlight system was activated. The first officer activated the heliport ground lights, which were a green color, via a radio frequency. Both pilots acknowledged observing green lights in their sight. The captain reported that he “cross-checked” the map display with the outside visual references to confirm alignment with the heliport, which he thought had matched. The first officer extended the landing gear, he completed the before landing checklist, and he then transitioned to viewing outside of the helicopter to try and visually acquire the heliport. The captain delayed turning on the landing lights until closer to the heliport to avoid glare from moisture and haze reflecting in the light beams. The captain began maneuvering the helicopter for landing. Within seconds, the captain lost outside visual references, and he transitioned to instruments. The first officer looked inside the cockpit and observed the radar altimeter indicated 20 ft. Before the first officer could verbally call out to execute a go around, the helicopter terrain awareness and warning system activated an alert, and the helicopter impacted trees and terrain. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, the main rotor system, the tail boom, the empennage, and the tail rotor system. The captain reported there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or the two turboshaft engines that would have precluded normal operation. A review of meteorological data at the time of the accident showed dark night conditions were present for the accident site. It is likely the flight crew failed to properly identify the heliport in dark night conditions, which resulted in the flight crew attempting to land at the incorrect location. It is also likely the flight crew failed to properly utilize navigation information and visual cues to verify the location of the heliport.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Collision during takeoff/land during landing defining event
- Evacuation during post (impact)
- Wrong surface or wrong airport during landing
- Navigation error during landing
The NTSB's findings
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Effect on operation
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance › Flight crew
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Flight crew
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Situational awareness › Flight crew
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Flight crew
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Flight crew
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Flight crew
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › (general) › Incorrect use/operation
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 13,043 hours in all; 344 in this make and model; 14 in the last 90 days; 3 in the last 30 days; 12,125 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: April 4, 2025
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: serious injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 6,160 hours in all; 56 in this make and model; 151 in the last 90 days; 21 in the last 30 days; 3,165 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: May 9, 2025
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,005.2 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, August 4, 2025; 3.6 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 11,875 lb
- Seats: 10
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210S (turboshaft); 1,005 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210S (turboshaft); 1,005 hours total
- Operator: Paradigm Helicopters LLC
The flight
- Departed from: DAL Dallas TX
- Destination: TA22 Dripping Springs TX
- Runway Heli, 10 ft by 10 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night, dark
- Wind: from 060° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 500 ft
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
- Altimeter: 30.08 inHg
- Observation at 9:15 pm from KRYW, 14 miles away
Weather report (METAR): METAR KRYW 010215Z AUTO 06003KT 7SM -RA SCT005 23/23 A3008 RMK AO2 T02260226=
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Photographs from the investigation 10 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photograph 1 – Aerial view of the accident site
Photograph 2 – Aerial view of the accident site
Photograph 3 – View of the fuselage and the empennage at the accident site
Photograph 4 – View of the fuselage at the accident site
Photograph 5 – View of the empennage at the accident site
Photograph 6 – View of the cockpit at the accident site
Photograph 7 – View from the private heliport looking to the north
Photograph 8 – View of the private heliport lighting
Photograph 9 – View of the private heliport lighting and lighted wind cone
Photograph 10 – View from the private heliport looking to the northwestThe NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
23 documents, released by the NTSB on August 19, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
