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Accidents · NTSB CEN18FA258 · Final report

Bell 47G accident near Arlington, Indiana, July 6, 2018

On July 6, 2018 at about 9:20 pm local time, a 1953 Bell 47G (helicopter), registered N96195, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (low-alt flying) near Arlington, Indiana. It was an aerial application (crop spraying) flight under agricultural flying rules (Part 137). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The inflight separation of the upper transmission due to the thread failure of transmission housing attachment bolts, which were installed on the helicopter with thread damage from a prior installation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 6, 2018 · about 9:20 pm local time
Place
Arlington, Indiana · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell 47G 2, built 1953 · all 47Gs on the register
Registration
N96195 · no longer on the register · serial 681
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · agricultural flying rules (Part 137)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial helicopter pilot was conducting aerial applications work on a corn field. The helicopter did not return to the loading platform when expected, and a subsequent search for the helicopter ensued. The wreckage of the helicopter was located near the south edge of a field being sprayed. The upper transmission, mast, and main rotor separated from the helicopter and were located about 75 ft north of the main wreckage. Ground scars, damage to the crop, and damage to the helicopter was consistent with an inflight separation of the upper transmission, mast, and main rotor. A postimpact fire ensued and damaged the cabin and engine of the helicopter. Postaccident examination of the lower transmission housing found elongation of four of the bolt holes and tearing of two of the bolt holes; two of the bolt holes were unremarkable. The upper main rotor transmission housing pieces and gears separated from the lower transmission housing due to shear fractures of the threads in six of the eight bolts attaching the housing pieces. The fractures likely occurred due to the fracture of threads on the two bolts that were weakened by thread damage from a prior installation using those bolts as discussed below. Specifically, these bolts showed damage on intact threads adjacent to the sheared threads. The damage had circumferential markings and a profile matching the nut threads with deformation to the remaining thread, consistent with an over-torque installation of a nut on the bolt. However, because the nuts likely did not back off from their installed position, the thread damage would have occurred during a prior installation. Thus, these two bolts were likely installed on the accident helicopter with damaged threads that were not detected at the time of installation. Additionally, one of the bolts had thread profile anomalies indicating that the bolt was likely manufactured with an incompletely formed thread. The deviations from the standard thread profile could have contributed to an improper fit with the installed nut and might have contributed to the thread damage on that bolt during a prior installation. For the other six bolts, the fit between the nut and the bolt might have contributed to threads shearing. The major diameter of threads on one of these six bolts was below minimum specification, which would limit the thread engagement to produce a shear fracture of the thread, and the major diameter of another of these bolts was close to the lower limit. No evidence of prior thread damage was observed on either of these bolts, indicating the failures were likely secondary to the failure of bolts Nos. 2 and 3. The housing assembly attachments showed evidence of poor maintenance practice. Deviations from the assembly drawing included the use of bolts with an incorrect number of washers and incorrect length. Furthermore, the damage to bolts 2 and 3 from a prior installation was not detected when the bolts were installed on the accident helicopter. Limited maintenance records were available for the helicopter. According to the available records, the main rotor transmission was replaced in 2009, and the transmission bolts were retorqued in 2014, about 73.6 flight hours before the accident. The investigation was unable to determine if any other maintenance was conducted on the transmission fasteners, when the maintenance was performed that initially damaged the threads of the two of the bolts, or when the damaged bolts were installed on the helicopter. No other mechanical anomalies were noted that would have precluded normal operation. The inflight separation of the upper transmission was due to the weakened bolt threads as a result of damage during a prior installation which caused the threads on those bolts as well as the threads on other bolts to fracture. However, the prior installation damage could not be associated to any particular maintenance action.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Part(s) separation from AC during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › (general) › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Fasteners › Incorrect service/maintenance

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 1,865 hours in all; 27 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: February 26, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: sngl
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 13,948.8 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 15, 2018; 27 hours since
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming Engines VO-435-A1F (piston); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Central Indiana AG Services, LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: Arlington IN at 8:55 pm
  • Destination: Arlington IN
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 040° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.23 inHg
  • Observation at 9:53 pm from KGEZ, 8 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

10 documents, released by the NTSB on March 17, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Witness Statement PDF, 2 pages View Download
2 Examination Summary Statement PDF, 4 pages View Download
3 Maintenance Records Excerpts PDF, 14 pages View Download
4 Aircraft Performance Study PDF, 8 pages View Download
5 Materials Laboratory Factural Report 18-074 PDF, 14 pages View Download
6 Non-volatile Memory Data Factual Report PDF, 7 pages View Download
7 Non-volatile Memory Data Attachment 1 data file Download
8 Non-volatile Memory Data Attachment 2 data file Download
9 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page View Download
10 Accident Report Photographs PDF, 11 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.