The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB WPR20LA012 · Final report

Czech Sport Aircraft Sportcruiser accident near Holden, Utah, October 23, 2019

On October 23, 2019 at about 1:50 am local time, a 2017 Czech Sport Aircraft Sportcruiser, registered N204BF, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Holden, Utah. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The fatigue failure of the No. 2 cylinder intake valve spring retainer due to air trapped in the lubrication system, which resulted in a total loss of engine power. Contributing to the severity of the damage was the improper deployment of the ballistic recovery system.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 23, 2019 · about 1:50 am local time
Place
Holden, Utah · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Czech Sport Aircraft Sportcruiser, built 2017
Registration
N204BF · no longer on the register · serial C0610
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

During a night flight, the airplane was at 11,000 ft mean sea level when the engine sputtered and lost total power. The propeller would not windmill, and the engine would not restart. Due to the dark night conditions, the pilot could not identify a safe forced landing area, so she deployed the ballistic recovery system (BRS) about 700 ft above ground level. The left-rear steel suspension cable, one of the two cables and two fabric straps attaching the BRS parachute to the airplane, separated in overload when it caught on a bolt during the BRS deployment. This resulted in an improper deployment of the BRS before the airplane touched down in a left-wing low attitude which substantially damaged the wing. Examination of the engine revealed the No. 2 intake valve spring retainer was broken, and the intake valve had fallen into the No. 2 combustion chamber, which resulted in the loss of power. The No. 2 valve spring shim exhibited a worn appearance with a groove visible around the shim. According to the engine manufacturer, worn valve spring shims are a clear sign of an engine operating with air in the oil system. This valve spring retainer failure was not the first one with a Rotax 900 series engine; in 2017, at the end of a cross-country flight, an airplane powered with the same series engine experienced a total loss of engine power, and the pilot performed a forced landing during which the airplane sustained substantial damage. Examination of that engine revealed the presence of a broken valve spring retainer that had resulted in the loss of power. Additionally, it was discovered that the valve spring retainer displayed evidence of metal fatigue. During 2019 and 2020, in addition to this accident, three more cases of broken valve spring retainers on the Rotax 900 engine series occurred in the United States. All the engines had differing hours of operation. Extensive metallurgical examination of the engine components from these four engines revealed that they met their specifications, and the fractured surfaces on the valve spring retainers revealed the presence of fatigue with pronounced vibration stripes, which was the same pattern that was observed on the valve spring retainer from the 2017 accident. Review of the engine manufacturer’s published guidance revealed that air could be introduced into the oil lubrication system through several means, including exceedance of the maximum bank angle of 40º, poorly or insufficiently vented hydraulic valve tappets, lack of proper oil system purging, spinning the propeller in the reverse direction from normal rotation, or opening portions of the oil system during maintenance or servicing. Testing of an exemplar engine with air introduced into the lubrication system revealed that with air trapped in the hydraulic tappets, it took about 6.5 minutes of engine operation at 2,538 rpm for air to be purged from the tappets allowing them to work as designed. This indicated that with air trapped in the hydraulic tappets, the valve train could be overloaded, which could lead to a fatigue crack and breakage of a valve spring retainer; this was likely the reason for the fatigue cracking of the valve spring retainers in the 2017 accident, in this accident, and in the other four 2019-2020 engine failures. During the investigation, the engine manufacturer reviewed its records and found a total of 18 production engine failures due to broken valve spring retainers. The engines were installed on multiple types of aircraft with a large spread in operating hours from as low as 7 hours to as high as 1,936.6 hours. All the components examined met their specifications, and not all the engines were affected by service bulletins that had been issued due to deviations in the manufacturing process of the valve push-rod assembly, which could result in partial wear on the rocker arm ball socket and lead to rocker arm cracking leading to a malfunction of the valve train. These engine failures indicated that valve train failure could occur for reasons other than the push-rod manufacturing issue such as air being introduced into the lubrication system. Additionally, after the engine manufacturer’s record review, an engine in an airplane that was produced in 2021, which should have had all changes included in Rotax guidance materials incorporated before it was placed into service, experienced a valve spring retainer failure, confirming that valve train failure could occur for reasons such as air being introduced into the lubrication system.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during enroute defining event
  2. Loss of engine power (total) during emergency descent
  3. Off-field or emergency landing during landing
  4. Attempted remediation/recovery during emergency descent
  5. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng cyl section › Failure
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng cyl section › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng oil sys › Related maintenance info
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng oil sys › Related operating info
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › (general) › (general) › Malfunction

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 187 hours in all; 89 in this make and model; 51.8 in the last 90 days; 22.4 in the last 30 days; 137.5 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
  • Last flight review: July 25, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,192.8 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, October 4, 2019
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,320 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rotax 912 ULS (piston); 1,770 hours total
  • Operator: Bountiful Flight LLC.

The flight

  • Departed from: PVU Provo UT at 11:30 pm
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: night, dark
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 21°F (-6°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.31 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

21 documents, released by the NTSB on August 31, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 NTSB Form 6120_1 PDF, 9 pages View Download
2 Operator Statements PDF, 6 pages View Download
3 Airframe and Engine Examination Report PDF, 25 pages View Download
4 Ballistic Recovery System Examination PDF, 2 pages View Download
5 Excerpts from Rotax 900 Series Operators Manual-engine Limitations PDF, 8 pages View Download
6 Excerpt from Rotax 912 Installation Manual-bank Angle Graphic PDF, 1 page View Download
7 Excerpt from Brp Rotax 912 Heavy Maintenance Manual -valve Spring Support PDF, 1 page View Download
8 Excerpts from Exemplar Flight Manuals-bank Angle Limitations PDF, 3 pages View Download
9 Preaccident Rotax Service Bulletins Dated October 12, 2017 PDF, 11 pages View Download
10 Post Accident Rotax Service Bulletin Dated April 16, 2021 PDF, 14 pages View Download
11 Pre Accident Rotax Service Instructions Dated April 16, 2018 PDF, 12 pages View Download
12 Post Accident Rotax Service Instructions Dated July 2, 2021 PDF, 15 pages View Download
13 Post Accident Rotax Service Bulletin Dated November 4, 2020 PDF, 12 pages View Download
14 Icon Aircraft Service Letter SL-081221-A PDF, 2 pages View Download
15 Service Instruction SI-04-1997-R3 PDF, 6 pages View Download
16 Service Instruction SI-912-018 PDF, 6 pages View Download
17 Memo for Record Statement on Air in the Hydraulic System PDF, 1 page View Download
18 Rotax 912 Operators Manual, Edition 4, Revision 0, Page 3-5 PDF, 1 page View Download
19 Chain of Custody Engine PDF, 8 pages View Download
20 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 2 pages View Download
21 Photos PDF, 4 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.