Cirrus SR22 accident near Ely, Nevada, February 16, 2019

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The noninstrument-rated pilot departed on a visual flight rules (VFR) 336 nautical mile (nm) cross-country flight to the northwest in a direct path toward the destination airport. Shortly after departure, the pilot advised air traffic control that he would be diverting to the south for weather; a cold front was passing over the route of flight, in which both VFR and instrument meteorological conditions (IFR) prevailed. About 1 hour and 27 minutes into the flight, the controller suggested to the pilot that in order to circumvent the weather, he fly from his present position southwest to an alternate airport, where he could then turn north to his destination; at this time the alternate airport was about 154 nm southwest of his position. The pilot subsequently advised the controller that he was “…going north to go under [the] deck in about 50 miles. Over the next several minutes, the airplane descended, followed by the controller advising the pilot that he was going in and out of radar contact. The controller provided the pilot a heading to the previously advised alternate airport which was reported as VFR. The pilot arrived at the alternate airport terminal area about 25 minutes after his decision to divert. Witnesses reported that the weather was below VFR minimums, with a solid ceiling of 200 ft above ground level, and visibility between 1/4 and 1/2 mile with snow. They also reported hearing the pilot click his microphone several times to activate the pilot-controlled runway lights. The pilot stated that if he could see the runway he could land, to which one of the witnesses informed the pilot that the runway lights were on. There were no further communications with the pilot. Onboard recorded data revealed that for about the last 10 minutes of flight, the pilot entered the airport terminal area south of the airport on a westerly heading at an altitude of 9,000 ft msl. He subsequently made a 90° right turn toward the north, followed by multiple right and left turns over the airport area at altitudes of between 7,100 ft msl to 7,800 ft msl; the airport elevation was 6,259 ft msl. The pilot then proceeded toward the northeast in a climbing right turn, most likely to proceed eastbound toward a more favorable airport. At this time, it was estimated that the pilot had about 2 hours of fuel remaining, an adequate fuel supply to divert back to the east about 80 nm where a myriad of airports were located that were operating under VFR conditions. However, in an attempt to ascend over a ridgeline to the east of more than 10,750 ft msl, upon reaching an altitude of about 9,400 ft msl, the airplane entered a descending right turn at a rate of descent of about 6,400 ft per minute and an indicated airspeed of about 210 kts, which is consistent with a high rate of descent. As icing was present in the area at the time of the accident, airframe icing most likely precipitated the stall, followed by entering the right spin and subsequent impact with terrain about 3.4 nm northeast of the airport at an altitude of about 6,929 ft msl. The airplane was not authorized for flight into known icing conditions. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.    The diversion airport’s ASOS visibility sensor was reporting visibilities which were inaccurate for weeks leading up to the accident, as well as on the day of the accident. The ASOS was scheduled to be repaired that day; however, the technician who was to perform the maintenance was unable to do so due to the weather conditions. Because snowfall intensity reporting was dependent on the visibility observation, inaccurate visibility reporting likely resulted in an unrepresentatively low reported snowfall intensity on the day of the accident. Although the erroneous visibility information provided by the ASOS may have contributed to the pilot’s decision to divert to the airport, as a noninstrument-rated pilot, it remained incumbent upon the pilot to maintain VFR conditions while maneuvering in an attempt to land. Had the pilot been aware of the impending instrument meteorological conditions that he was about to encounter he might have diverted to an airport with better conditions. According to Flight Services, neither they nor any third-party vendors had any contact with the accident pilot.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.