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Accidents · NTSB WPR18LA242 · Final report

Bell 212 accident near Dardanelle, California, August 25, 2018

On August 25, 2018 at about 10:45 pm local time, a 1977 Bell 212 (helicopter), registered N512TA, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach near Dardanelle, California. It was a firefighting flight under public-use (government) rules. 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

An in-flight failure of the trunnion bearing and subsequent failure of the drive link and swashplate support, which resulted in the loss of helicopter control.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 25, 2018 · about 10:45 pm local time
Place
Dardanelle, California · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell 212 No Series, built 1977 · all 212s on the register
Registration
N512TA · registry record · serial 30863
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Firefighting flight · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was conducting water bucket operations when he heard a one-per-revolution whispering sound emanating from the helicopter. He elected to return to the helibase and accepted the Air Attack controller’s offer to escort him back. While en route to the helibase, at an airspeed about 60 knots, the whispering sound evolved into a vibration that progressively worsened. The pilot then elected to land as soon as possible at a nearby location. Upon arrival to the precautionary landing site, the vibration momentarily stopped and was followed by a loud bang, an aggressive vertical vibration, and a loss of control. The helicopter impacted steep mountainous terrain and rolled once onto its left side. The occupants of the escort helicopter observed the accident helicopter nose over about 20° to 30°, followed by a 360° flat turn before it impacted the terrain. Examination of the wreckage revealed that multiple components of the main rotor control system had failed along with a span-wise failure of one of the main rotor blades. The drive link associated with the failed rotor blade had failed in overload at its lower lug and swashplate trunnion bearing. The outer race of the trunnion bearing exhibited brinelling consistent with axial movement of the inner section of the bearing. The inner section of the trunnion bearing separated from the rotating swashplate along with the lower lug of the drive link. Gouges and impact marks found on the arms of the non-rotating swashplate were likely made from the lower lug of the drive link as the inner section of the trunnion bearing began to pull out of the outer race. Contact of the lower lug with one of the arms of the non-rotating swashplate likely resulted in the overload failure of the drive link. These liberated components were not recovered. The in-flight failure of the swashplate drive link resulted in the loss of control of the associated main rotor blade. The uncontrolled blade, free to move out of track with the other controlled blade, resulted in at least a partial loss of control of the main rotor system. The associated vibrations from the out-of-track rotors likely resulted in the failure of the swashplate support and the total loss of control of the helicopter.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during approach
  2. Flight control sys malf/fail during approach defining event
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
  4. Attempted remediation/recovery during approach

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Main rotor system › Main rotor blade system › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › (general) › Damaged/degraded

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 4,788 hours in all; 950.4 in this make and model; 87.5 in the last 90 days; 46.5 in the last 30 days; 4,613 as pilot in command; 440 on instruments
  • Last flight review: March 14, 2018
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,530.0 hours
  • Last inspection: inspection type not recorded, August 23, 2018; 13 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 11,200 lb
  • Seats: 11
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney PT-6T-3B (turboshaft); 3,578 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney PT-6T-3B (turboshaft); 5,912 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: Bald Mountain Helibase CA at 9:45 pm
  • Destination: Donnell Fire CA

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 260° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 90°F (32°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.98 inHg

Weather report (METAR): METAR KO22 252235Z AUTO 26006KT 9SM CLR 32/06 A2998 RMK A01=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

14 documents, released by the NTSB on September 27, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.