The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB WPR17LA164 · Final report

Piper PA 28R-180 accident near San Jose, California, July 23, 2017

On July 23, 2017 at about 7:47 pm local time, a 1968 Piper PA 28R-180, registered N4594J, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near San Jose, California (Reid-Hillview Of Santa Clara C airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Maintenance personnel's incorrect installation of the aileron control cables and subsequent failure to verify proper aileron functionality following the maintenance, which resulted in roll control that was opposite of that commanded by the pilot, and the pilot's inadequate preflight inspection, during which he did not verify that the aileron movement matched the control yoke input.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 23, 2017 · about 7:47 pm local time
Place
San Jose, California · Reid-Hillview Of Santa Clara C · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA 28R-180 180, built 1968 · all PA 28R-180s on the register
Registration
N4594J · no longer on the register · serial 28R-30470
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial pilot reported that the accident flight was the first flight following maintenance, which included the installation of right-seat rudder pedals with brake controls. The pilot stated that, during a preflight inspection of the airplane, he actuated the ailerons; however, he did not verify which direction the control yoke moved. He again checked the flight control movement before takeoff but did not verify which direction the aileron moved when he moved the control yoke. During the takeoff sequence, as the airplane became airborne, it immediately entered an uncommanded left roll. The pilot attempted to correct for the roll; however, he was unable to do so and subsequently reduced the engine power. The airplane then impacted the ground and came to rest upright on an adjacent runway. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that, when the control yoke was rotated for input of right aileron, the right aileron moved down, and the left aileron moved up, which is opposite of what would be expected. Examination of the aileron cables revealed that they remained attached to the "T" bar aileron control chains; however, the right aileron control cable was attached to the left aileron control chain, and the left aileron control cable was attached to the right aileron control chain; thus, the cables were connected backward. The cables were oriented such that they crossed underneath the flap handle and center console area. The two mechanics who performed the maintenance on the airplane reported that they had disconnected the aileron control cables to facilitate the installation of the rudder pedals and brake controls. After completing the maintenance, they checked the flight control cable tension and aileron movement; however, they did not observe which direction the control yoke moved when the aileron was moved. It is likely that the mechanics attached the aileron control cables backward during the reassembly of the aileron control system, which resulted in roll control that was opposite of that commanded by the pilot.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during takeoff defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during takeoff

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Inadequate inspection
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 6,000 hours in all; 30 in the last 90 days; 15 in the last 30 days; 5,900 as pilot in command; 4,900 on instruments
  • Last flight review: May 31, 2016
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: annual inspection; 0 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,500 lb
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-320 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: RHV San Jose CA
  • Destination: Marina CA
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 31R, 3,100 ft by 75 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 91°F (33°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.82 inHg
  • Observation at 7:53 pm from KRHV

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

7 documents, released by the NTSB on November 3, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.