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Accidents · NTSB ERA16FA108 · Final report

Beech A36 accident near Marshville, North Carolina, February 19, 2016

On February 19, 2016, a 1983 Beech A36, registered N61WB, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Marshville, North Carolina. It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's improper preflight fuel planning, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the severity of the pilot's injuries was his failure to have a properly secured shoulder harness at the time of the accident.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 19, 2016
Place
Marshville, North Carolina · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech A36 UNDESIGNAT, built 1983 · all A36s on the register
Registration
N61WB · no longer on the register · serial E-2110
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airline transport pilot departed on the instrument flight rules cross-country flight in night visual meteorological conditions with about 45 gallons of fuel, which, based on fuel burn rates, was sufficient for about 3 hours of flight. About 3 hours after departure and 50 miles from the destination airport, the pilot told air traffic control he was having engine problems and requested a vector to the nearest airport. A witness near the accident site heard the airplane descending and described the sound of an engine being re-started several times. The airplane came to rest in wooded terrain. Postaccident examination revealed the wing bladder tanks were intact, and no visible fuel was observed in either tank. When the wings were removed, a total of less than 2 quarts of fuel was drained from both the left and right fuel tanks. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no pre-accident mechanical deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot was aware that the left and right fuel tank bladders were bulging prior to the accident flight. The bulging fuel bladders may have resulted in erroneous fuel quantity readings during the flight. Given the absence of fuel in the airplane's fuel tanks and the length of flight that corresponded to the fuel available, the pilot likely departed without sufficient fuel to complete the flight to the intended destination and the loss of engine power was likely the result of fuel exhaustion. The pilot was found deceased, slumped over in the left seat, still wearing his lap belt. Although the airplane was equipped with a single shoulder harness (across the left shoulder), it was not secured to the lap belt at the time of the accident. The pilot's failure to have properly secured the shoulder harness at the time of the accident likely contributed to the severity of his injuries. Examination of the pilot's seatbelt and shoulder harness assembly revealed that the seat belt shoulder harness attachment post elastic grommet was not installed, nor was it found in the wreckage. When manually assembled, the shoulder harness attachment buckle would not seat securely to the seatbelt attachment post.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
  2. Fuel exhaustion during enroute defining event
  3. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › (general) › Damaged/degraded
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings › Flight compartment equipment › Incorrect use/operation

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 17,000 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,884.3 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, May 15, 2015; 41 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,651 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Continental Motors Inc IO-520-BB (piston); 1,884 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: DAB Daytona Beach FL at 8:54 pm
  • Destination: EXX Lexington NC
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 030° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 48°F (9°C), dew point 28°F (-2°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.43 inHg
  • Observation at 11:53 pm from EQY, 11 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

14 documents, released by the NTSB on December 21, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.