Piper PA-23-160 accident near Graniteville, South Carolina, November 25, 2013
On November 25, 2013 at about 11:04 pm local time, a 1958 Piper PA-23-160, registered N4016P, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Graniteville, South Carolina (Twin Lakes Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's improper maintenance of the airplane's fuel system, which resulted a loss of power in the left engine due to fuel starvation. Also causal was the pilot's failure to maintain minimum controllable airspeed following the loss of engine power, which resulted in a loss of airplane control.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 25, 2013 · about 11:04 pm local time
- Place
- Graniteville, South Carolina · Twin Lakes Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA-23-160, built 1958 · all PA-23-160s on the register
- Registration
- N4016P · no longer on the register · serial 23-1491
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During the initial climb after a night takeoff, the left engine lost power. A witness reported that the pilot attempted to return to the runway he had taken off from, but he lost control. The airplane descended, struck trees, and came to rest next to a taxiway that paralleled the departure runway. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane had not been configured for single engine flight; the left engine's propeller was not feathered, and the landing gear was down. Because the hydraulic pump was installed on the left engine, it would not have been operating after the engine lost power. Therefore, the pilot would have had to manually retract the landing gear by pumping the emergency pump handle 30 to 40 times. However, given the pilot's decision to return to the airport, he may have elected not to retract the landing gear. With the left engine's propeller not feathered and the landing gear down, the airplane would have rapidly decelerated unless the pilot lowered the airplane's nose to maintain airspeed. Additionally, in order to maintain control during the right turn, the pilot needed to counteract the tendency for the airplane's bank angle to increase due to the asymmetrical power from the right engine. The airplane's airspeed likely decreased below the single engine minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc), which resulted in the loss of control. Before the accident, the pilot conveyed concerns about the airplane's left fuel valve control to two separate airframe and powerplant mechanics. During the conversations, he detailed his plans to troubleshoot and attempt to repair the problem himself. The mechanics urged the pilot not to perform the maintenance himself and to have the problem diagnosed by a knowledgeable certificated mechanic. The pilot was not a certificated mechanic and was not authorized to perform maintenance on the accident airplane. Postaccident examination of the airplane's fuel system revealed that, although the left and right fuel valve controls were selected to the main tank positions, the left and right main fuel tank shutoff valves were closed, and the left and right auxiliary fuel tank shutoff valves were open. Therefore, the left and right engines were being supplied with fuel from their respective auxiliary tanks instead of from the main tanks. The fuel tanks were damaged; however, fuel was observed in the corners of the left and right main tanks and in the right auxiliary tank, but the left auxiliary fuel tank was devoid of fuel. Therefore, the left engine loss of power was due to fuel starvation. Examination of the fuel valve control cable assemblies revealed that neither the left or right cable assembly was connected to its respective auxiliary fuel valve arm assembly, which controlled both the main and auxiliary fuel shutoff valves. Because the securing hardware was still in place and was undamaged, it is likely that the control cable assemblies had, at some point, been disconnected from the arm assemblies and not reconnected. This resulted in the engines receiving fuel from the auxiliary tanks when the fuel valve controls were selected to the main tank positions. Given the pilot's discussions with the mechanics, it is likely that he disconnected the control cable assemblies from the arm assemblies when he attempted to troubleshoot the problem.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Fuel starvation during initial climb defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb
- Loss of control in flight during emergency descent
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Unauthorized maint/repair › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,653 hours in all; 28 in this make and model; 16 in the last 90 days; 12 in the last 30 days; 1,449 as pilot in command; 451 on instruments
- Last flight review: September 5, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,671.8 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, August 1, 2013
- Maximum gross weight: 3,801 lb
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Lycoming O-320-B (piston); 2,539 hours total
- Engine 2: Lycoming O-320-B (piston); 2,539 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: S17 Graniteville SC at 11:04 pm
- Destination: S17 Graniteville SC
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 06, 4,000 ft by 60 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 090° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 2,800 ft
- Temperature: 48°F (9°C), dew point 37°F (3°C)
- Altimeter: 30.37 inHg
- Observation at 11:08 pm from KDNL, 14 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
15 documents, released by the NTSB on October 8, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
