Uvify IFO accident near Orlando, Florida, December 21, 2024

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The accident occurred during the initial phase of a 500 small unmanned aircraft (sUA) drone light show when multiple sUA failed to achieve proper spatial separation, resulting in midair collisions and subsequent loss of control. Several sUA entered the audience which resulted in a serious injury to a spectator. Drone show software (DSS) revealed that the uploaded show center position was incorrect resulting in an approximate 5meter (16.4ft) displacement from the intended location. This error caused the system to assign incorrect aircraft to flight paths. In addition, the show heading had not been entered correctly and was rotated by about 7°. These cumulative errors resulted in crossing paths and collisions during takeoff with flight paths closer to spectators than intended. Furthermore, when the show center location was updated only 498 drones were selected rather than 500, which resulted in 2 drones with different show center positions than the others. Because the system relies on precise spatial alignment for deconfliction, these inconsistencies caused multiple sUA to converge during the initial climb, consistent with video evidence showing non-uniform liftoff followed by collisions. The misalignment of the show heading resulted in the show flight position being off by about 18 meters or 59 ft, which moved the show closer to the audience. The policy for margin between the soft geofence and hard geofence had changed from 5 meters (about 16.4 ft) to 1 meter (3.28 ft)12 days before the accident. According to the operator, it was the responsibility of the remote pilot-in-command (RPIC) to update the command laptops with the new margin default setting as they were being used for shows. The data revealed that the geofence margin had not been updated and was set to 5 meters (16.4 ft). The combined errors resulted in a reduced safety area that was outside the company’s standards. The FAA-issued certificate of waiver assigned responsibility for safe operations to management personnel. However, the operator lacked a formal requirement for independent verification of critical show parameters before launch. The absence of a robust cross-check or supervisory oversight allowed multiple configuration errors—including incorrect show center position, improper heading entry, inconsistent aircraft updates, and nonstandard geofence settings—to go undetected.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

Other NTSB records under UNREG the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time