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Accidents · NTSB CEN24LA128 · Final report

Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH MBB-BK 117 C-2 accident near West Lafayette, Indiana, March 7, 2024

On March 7, 2024 at about 2:40 am local time, a 2009 Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH MBB-BK 117 C-2 (helicopter), registered N191LL, was substantially damaged in an accident during taxi (to runway) near West Lafayette, Indiana (Purdue University airport). It was a positioning flight under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The failure of maintenance personnel to properly install the tail rotor pitch change slider attachment hardware (T-bolt), which led to the disconnection of the pitch change slider, a loss of tail rotor control, and subsequent hard landing. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel’s failure to complete a maintenance discrepancy entry on the work order for the removal of the T-bolt.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 7, 2024 · about 2:40 am local time · cases in 2024
Place
West Lafayette, Indiana · Purdue University · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH MBB-BK 117 C-2, built 2009
Registration
N191LL · registry record · serial 9319
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that while in a hover taxi to accelerate for takeoff, he felt a force against his feet from the pedals and the helicopter began to yaw to the right. The pilot was unable to arrest the right yaw with pedal inputs. The helicopter landed hard, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, tailboom, vertical fin, horizontal stabilizer, tail rotor assembly, and one main rotor blade. Postaccident examination revealed that the T-bolt and its attachment bolts, which connects the pitch change bellcrank to the pitch change slider, became disconnected during operation due to inadequate installation. Specifically, the T-bolt attachment bolts were installed but not torqued and safety wired to maintenance manual requirements, allowing them to back out during operation. Once the T-bolt attachment bolts backed out, the T-bolt also backed out and separated from the pitch change slider, resulting in a loss of tail rotor pitch control. The T-bolt likely impacted one of the tail rotor blades, resulting in the separation of the outboard portion of its leading edge and afterbody. The subsequent imbalance of the tail rotor, due to the damaged tail rotor blade, led to overload separation of the upper portion of the vertical fin. During maintenance of the accident helicopter in the days leading up to the accident, the T-bolt and its attachment bolts were removed by a mechanic at the direction of a lead mechanic to facilitate troubleshooting of adjacent components for the tail rotor control system. That mechanic assumed that the T-bolt’s removal was temporary and quick, so he did not follow established procedures by recording the removal in the discrepancy sheet for the work order. The T-bolt attachment bolts were subsequently temporarily installed “finger-tight” by another mechanic to assist a mechanic who was installing the tail rotor blade mounting forks and pitch change links. However, the first mechanic was tasked to another company helicopter shortly after, and while he stated he relayed to the other mechanics that the T-bolt attachment bolts were finger-tight, no one followed up on the installation of the T-bolt attachment bolts to ensure they were torqued correctly and safety wired. Additionally, no one from the maintenance team found that the safety wiring for the T-bolt attachment bolts was missing during final checks of the helicopter before it was released for an operational check flight. Since there was no maintenance discrepancy entry for the removal of the T-bolt, there was no formalized task for the maintenance team to track and verify the complete T-bolt installation, including torquing and safety wiring the T-bolt attachment bolts. Therefore, the lack of an entry in the work order discrepancy sheet for the T-bolt’s removal contributed to this accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during taxi (to runway)
  2. Part(s) separation from AC during taxi (to runway) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incomplete action › Maintenance personnel
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Record › keeping › Aircraft/maintenance logs › Maintenance personnel
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the flight controls

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 6,266 hours in all; 566 in this make and model; 36 in the last 90 days; 18 in the last 30 days; 4,666 as pilot in command; 2,032 on instruments
  • Last flight review: November 8, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 7,434.5 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, March 6, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 7,904 lb
  • Seats: 5
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: Safran Arriel 1E2 (turboshaft); 5,027 hours total
  • Engine 2: Safran Arriel 1E2 (turboshaft); 4,040 hours total
  • Operator: Metro Aviation

The flight

  • Destination: Monticello IN

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 060° at 9 knots, gusting 16
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 2,100 ft; a few clouds
  • Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 39°F (4°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.06 inHg
  • Observation at 9:54 pm from KLAF

Weather report (METAR): KLAF 070254Z AUTO 06009G16KT 10SM OVC021 08/04 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP182 T00830039 53014

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi2
Flight crew1

Photographs from the investigation 10 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

15 documents, released by the NTSB on April 24, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/CEN24LA128.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.